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INTRODUCTION
Should investors trust the advice they receive from Wall Street's
"sell-side"' research analysts? In late March 2000, the stock market bub-
ble burst and the U.S. stock market began a historic collapse that has
since shed trillions of dollars in market capitalization.2 One of the more
prominent villains that has arisen from the crash has been Wall Street's
sell-side analysts, who are nominally responsible for making stock rec-
I. Sell-side analysts work for brokerage firms and produce research reports that are used by
the brokerage firm to "sell" investment ideas to its clients. For a more detailed description of sell-
side analysts, as well as descriptions of buy-side analysts (who work for entities that invest for their
own account in securities on a regular basis, such as mutual funds, hedge funds, insurance compa-
nies, or retirement funds) and independent analysts (who, like sell-side analysts, provide research to
motivate a third-party investor to make an investment decision, but are not linked with a particular
broker or investment bank), see Securities and Exchange Commission, Investor Alert: Analyzing
Analyst Recommendations, at http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm (last visited Nov. 16,
2003) [hereinafter Analyzing Analyst Recommendations].
2. It is difficult to compare one market crash to another-and that is not the focus of this
Article. However, it is clear that the recent stock market collapse has been very serious (due to its
severity and its longevity). Below is a chart that helps to illustrate the severity of the 2000 stock
market meltdown:
Peak Trough (Oct. 10, 2002) Percentage Change
Dow Jones 11908 (1/14/00) 7181 -39.7%
S&P 500 1553 (3/24/00) 769 -50.5%
NASDAQ 5132 (3/10/00) 1108 -78.4%
Source: Yahoo! Finance, at http://finance.yahoo.com (selecting specific index under "Market Sum-
mary," then "Historical Prices").
To illustrate the longevity of the 2000 stock market meltdown: 2002 marked the third straight year
that the Dow Jones Industrial Average declined; a phenomenon we have not seen since 1939-1941.
Jeff D. Opdyke, Year-End Review of Markets & Finance 2002-Essay: History Says Gray Days Will
End, but Maybe Not Right Away-Market Endures 1st 3-Year Slump Since Pearl Harbor, and Re-
covery Will Take Time, Too, and Patience, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2003, at R7.
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ommendations to investors. 3 In the late 1990s, these sell-side analysts
rose to prominence as the U.S. stock market climbed to record heights.
Historically an anonymous group on Wall Street, 4 sell-side analysts be-
came media darlings and achieved near "rock-star" status5 as their pre-
dictions of rising stock prices were largely validated with the U.S. ex-
periencing the longest bull market in its history.6
Unfortunately, these same analysts failed to warn investors of the
impending crash and have since drawn considerable attention from regu-
lators, politicians, investors, and the media.7 The primary focus of the
recent attention has been on conflicts of interest that plague sell-side
research, with particular attention paid to the influence of investment
banking fees on research. Did these conflicts of interest impact sell-side
analysts in both their role in inflating the stock market's bubble and their
failure to warn of its burst? Regulators have clearly indicated their belief
that conflicts of interest were a primary culprit and have moved to dra-
matically revamp the environment for sell-side research, with four major
regulatory actions: (1) the inclusion of Section 501 (governing analyst
conflicts of interest) in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002;8 (2) the enact-
ment by the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") and
the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") of very detailed regulations
governing research analysts and their firms; (3) the enactment of Regula-
tion Analyst Certification; and (4) a $1.4 billion global settlement with
ten of the leading U.S. investment banks (collectively the "Regulatory
Actions"). The foundation for the Regulatory Actions is the hypothesis
that sell-side research analysts provided investors with poor investment
3. See Shoot All the Analysts, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2001, at 22; see also Charles Gasparino,
Deals & Deal Makers: Outlook for Analysts: Skepticism and Blame, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2001, at
Cl.
4. BENJAMIN MARK COLE, THE PIED PIPERS OF WALL STREET: How ANALYSTS SELL YOU
DOWN THE RIVER, at xi (2001).
5. Raymond L. Moss, Michael P. Gilmore & Gerald B. Kline, The Wall Street Analyst: Rise
and Fall of a Rock Star, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 2002: TAKING CONTROL OF THE PROCESS 10 1
(PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B0-01A6, 2002); see also Ken Brown &
Jeff D. Opdyke, Analysts Were Once the Rock Stars of the Street, but Tunes Changed, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 16, 2001, at C]; Charles Gasparino, NASD Prepares Action Against a Star Analyst: Salomon's
Grubman Faces Allegations He Touted Winstar Despite Red Flags, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2002, at
AI [hereinafter Gasparino, Red Flags].
6. A bull market is:
A prolonged period in which investment prices rise faster than their historical average.
Bull markets can happen as a result of an economic recovery, an economic boom, or in-
vestor psychology. The longest and most famous bull market is the one that began in the
early 1990s in which the U.S. equity markets grew at their fastest pace ever.
Webfinance, Inc., Investorwords, at http://www.investorwords.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
Some trace the recently ended bull market back to 1982. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL
EXUBERANCE 5-7 (2000).
7. See infra Part I.D for a discussion of analysts' failure to warn investors of the impending
crash.
8. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 1I, 15, 18, 28, and 29
U.S.C.) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley Act].
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guidance due to the severe conflicts of interest they faced. 9 Conse-
quently, the primary focus of the Regulatory Actions has been to render
sell-side research more independent, in order to promote the integrity of,
and restore confidence in, sell-side research analysts.")
While certain aspects of the Regulatory Actions are not objection-
able, taken as a whole, the Regulatory Actions are not likely to improve
the performance of sell-side analysts. However, by restoring confidence
in these analysts, the Regulatory Actions expose the most vulnerable
class of investors-retail investors-to inappropriate financial risk. To
understand this problem, one must first ask the most fundamental ques-
tion: Is sell-side research valuable?" The answer to this question turns
out to be both "yes" and "maybe not." Yes, sell-side analysts provide
valuable information and analysis that assists the market to efficiently
determine the appropriate price for a given stock.' 2 Maybe not, in that
sell-side analysts have historically had difficulties with both forecasting
the future performance of companies and making stock recommenda-
tions. 13 More specifically, numerous studies have demonstrated that: (1)
it is unclear whether investing strategies based on sell-side analysts' rec-
ommendations will consistently outperform the market; and (2) sell-side
analysts have consistently proven to be overly optimistic about the future
performance of the companies they cover.
9. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Self-Regularoty Organizations, Order Approv-
ing Proposed Rule Changes by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Exchange Rules 344
("Supervisory Analysts"), 345A ("Continuing Education for Registered Persons"), 351 ("Reporting
Requirements"), and 472 ("Communications with the Public"), and by the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Research Analysts Conflicts of Interest, and Notice of Filing and
Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Amendment No. 3 to the Proposed Rule Changes by the
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and Amendment No. 3 to the Proposed Rule Change by the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest,
Release No. 34-48252; File No. SR-NASD-2002-154; SR-NYSE-2002-49 (July 29, 2003), available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48252.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004) [hereinafter SEC Release
No. 34-482521; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 8, at § 501 (codified as new § 15D of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6 (2002)); Regulation AC-Analyst Certifica-
tion, 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.500 to 242.505; Final Rule Release: Regulation Analyst Certification, Securi-
ties Act Release No. 33-8193; Exchange Act Release No. 34-47384, 17 C.F.R. § 242 (2003), avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/rules/finalU33-8193.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Regula-
tion AC Press Release]; Joint Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, New York
Attorney General's Office, North American Securities Administrators Association, National Asso-
ciation of Securities Dealers and New York Stock Exchange, Ten of Nation's Top Investment Firms
Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment Bank-
ing (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http:/www.sec.govlnews/press/2003-54.htm (last visited Sept. 17,
2003) [hereinafter Press Release on Global Settlement]; William H. Donaldson, Testimony Concern-
ing Global Research Analyst Settlement, Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs (May 7, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts050703whd.htm
(last visited Sept. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Donaldson Testimony].
10. See supra note 9.
11. Donald Luskin asked this same question in a recent article, and concluded that the answer
is both "yes and no." Donald Luskin, Enough Analyst Bashing, CAPITALISM MAGAZINE (Nov. 27,
2002), available at http://www.capmag.com/article.asp?ID=2204 (last visited Oct. 25, 2003).
12. See infra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
13. See discussion infra Part [V.A.
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Can this "maybe not" problem be fixed? Can sell-side analysts'
forecasting and recommendation abilities be improved? The Regulatory
Actions seek to improve sell-side research primarily by separating it
from the influences of investment banking.' 4 While substantial verbiage
is given to "clearly separating" research from investment banking, this
Article will argue that the separation required by the Regulatory Actions
is not substantial and is not likely to change the fundamental pressures at
the root of the conflict.' 5 The only way to truly separate research from
investment banking's influence would be to require a complete divesti-
ture of research from brokerage firms that conduct investment banking
activities. However, the ramifications of such a forced separation are
likely to be substantially worse than the status quo arrangement, as the
separation would likely cause a reduction in both the quality and volume
of available investment research.' 6 Moreover, based on a substantial
body of work that has been conducted on this subject, it is unclear
whether rendering sell-side analysts more independent will substantially
improve their forecasting and recommendation skills. 17 There appears to
be a number of significant biases and factors that impact the quality of
sell-side research in addition to conflicts of interest. As a result, it is both
misleading and harmful to investors for regulators to attempt to restore
credibility in what is likely to continue to be a very faulty system.
Consequently, there does not appear to be a solution to the "maybe
not" problem, and sell-side research will continue to operate under the
"yes/maybe not" dichotomy. Institutional investors have long understood
this dichotomy.' 8 A New York Times editorial described the relationship
between sell-side analysts and institutional investors as follows: "Fund
managers are not schoolchildren looking for instructions on what to buy.
They look to [sell-side] analysts for specific information and general
insight."' 9 Unfortunately, the dichotomy does not appear to be widely
understood by retail investors,2° who increasingly have become owners
of publicly traded stocks. Rather than encourage retail investors to see
sell-side research for what it truly is, the Regulatory Actions mask the
weaknesses of sell-side research, and lend renewed credibility to these
analysts. By early 2000, sell-side analysts, in many ways, had become
14. See supra note 9.
15. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
16. Id.
17. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
18. Institutional investors are entities with large amounts of money to invest, such as mutual
funds, insurance companies, pension funds, and investment banks. For a more detailed discussion of
institutional investors see discussion infra Part V.A. For a discussion of institutional investors'
understanding of the dichotomy, see Leslie Boni & Kent L. Womack, Wall Street's Credibility
Problem: Misaligned Incentives and Dubious Fixes?, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON
FINANCIAL SERVICES 2002, at 94, 116 (2002).
19. Gary Sernovitz, Editorial, Don't Shoot the Analyst, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2002, at A3 1.
20. See Boni & Womack, supra note 18, at 94, 116.
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"informal advisers and stock-picking gurus to the masses.",2' Retail in-
vestors have paid a very expensive price to learn the weaknesses of sell-
side analysts. Rather than enforce this lesson, the regulators are working
to erase it from investors' memories, which increases the likelihood that
we will once again be discussing the damaging impact of sell-side ana-
lysts when the next major bear market22 hits.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of research analysts and
their basic functions, including a discussion of sell-side analysts' role in
the market's recent boom and bust. Part II examines the conflicts of in-
terest that have plagued sell-side research, and Part III reviews the Regu-
latory Actions that are meant to address these conflicts. In Part IV, the
author will make the case for encouraging, rather than lessening, investor
skepticism in sell-side research and will explain why the Regulatory Ac-
tions are not likely to improve the performance of sell-side analysts. Fi-
nally, Part V will offer a simpler proposal to address the sell-side analyst
issue. While there may not be a solution to the "maybe not" problem, the
information gap between institutional investors and retail investors re-
garding the weaknesses of sell-side research can be eliminated, which
would allow retail investors to benefit from the value of sell-side re-
search while also granting them the opportunity to properly protect them-
selves from its weaknesses. Akin to the Surgeon General's warning for
cigarette manufacturers, this Article proposes that sell-side analysts and
their firms be required to prominently include, with all research, a short
and clear warning from the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), regarding the historical weaknesses of sell-side
research.2 3
I. OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH ANALYSTS
Analysts have historically played an important role in the U.S. capi-
tal markets by "promoting the efficiency of our markets by ferreting out
facts and offering valuable insights on companies and industry trends. 24
The concept is that securities markets are very efficient at pricing and
allocating capital based on all of the publicly available information at the
21. Keith Regan, Are Tech Stock Analysts Too Powerful?, E-COMMERCE TIMES (Apr. 10,
2001), at http:lwww.ecommercetimes.comlperllstory/884 1.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2003).
22. A bear market is:
A prolonged period in which investment prices fall, accompanied by widespread pessi-
mism. If the period of falling stock prices is short and immediately follows a period of
rising stock prices, it is instead called a correction. Bear markets usually occur when the
economy is in a recession and unemployment is high, or when inflation is rising quickly.
The most famous bear market in U.S. history was the Great Depression of the 1930s.
Webfinance, Inc., Investorwords, at http://www.investorwords.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
23. A "Surgeon General's warning" approach has also been proposed by Gary Semovitz. See
Semovitz, supra note 19.
24. Analyzing Analyst Recommendations, supra note I.
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25time. The more information that is available about a given stock, and
the more reliable that information is, the more efficient the capital mar-
kets will be at generating the appropriate price for that stock. Analysts
are a principal source of this information. There are three main categories




Sell-side analysts have recently dominated the media's attention.
Sell-side analysts work for brokerage firms, 27 which serve as intermedi-
aries between buyers and sellers in securities transactions. Sell-side ana-
lysts produce research reports that are used by brokerage firms to "sell"
investment ideas to their clients (e.g., whether to buy, hold, or sell a par-
ticular stock). Many of the most high-profile sell-side analysts (e.g.,
Henry Blodgett (formerly of Merrill Lynch), Jack Grubman (formerly of
Solomon Smith Barney), Paul Johnson (formerly of Robertson
Stephens), and Mary Meeker (of Morgan Stanley)) work for brokerage
firms that also provide investment-banking services for their corporate
clients. Both the brokerage and investment banking relationships can
lead to substantial conflicts of interest that will be discussed in detail in
Part II of this Article.
Typical characteristics shared by most sell-side analysts include:2 8
" Specializing in one specific industry sector (e.g., automotive, me-
dia, pharmaceuticals, or telecommunications).29
" Generating detailed research reports on the companies they cover.
Such reports will usually contain a rating (e.g., buy, hold, or sell),
a price-target for the stock, an earnings model, detailed analysis
regarding the company (including both strengths and weaknesses
of the company), comparisons of the company to its peer group,
and an investment thesis.
* Gathering information for research reports by reading the com-
pany's SEC filings, meeting with its management, talking with
25. This is a rudimentary description of the semi-strong form of the efficient market theory.
For a more detailed discussion of the efficient market theory, see infra notes 287-89 and accompany-
ing text.
26. Analyzing Analyst Recommendations, supra note I.
27. There are a number of different types of brokerage firms, including insurance brokerage
firms and real estate brokerage firms. All references to brokerage firms in this Article, however, are
to securities brokerage firms.
28. See Frank Fernandez, The Roles and Responsibilities of Securities Analysts, 7 RES. REP. 3,
3-4 (2001), available at http://www.sia.com/research/pdf/RsrchRprtVol2-7.PDF (last visited Nov.
16, 2003); see also Roni Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of
Underwriter Analyst Recommendations, 12 THE REV. OF FIN. STUD. 653, 657-59 (1999); Analyzing
Analyst Recommendations, supra note I.
29. Brokerage firms may also employ generalist analysts, who cover the movements of the
market as a whole or general economic conditions, rather than specific companies.
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personally cultivated sources in the industry (including suppliers
and customers), and following the news generally.
* Focusing on a very limited number of stocks (usually ten to fif-
teen), because generating and maintaining such research reports is
a very time-consuming effort.
Research reports are typically made available only to clients of the
brokerage firm, although in the last few years, many brokerage firms
have begun to distribute their reports to non-clients as well, through re-
search resale services30 or through discount brokerage firms.3' Part II of
this Article will address the economics of sell-side research. While the
reports themselves are only distributed to clients, the information in sell-
side research reports typically gets into the market very quickly, and is
generally viewed to be publicly available information.32 Moreover, with
the emergence of all-business-news cable networks and Internet sites,
and the increased focus given by the media to business and financial
news, sell-side analysts have taken to providing investment advice
through general media outlets in addition to their traditional research
reports.33
B. Buy-Side Analysts
Buy-side analysts work for entities that invest on a regular basis for
their own accounts in securities such as mutual funds, hedge funds, in-
surance companies, or retirement funds. A buy-side analyst conducts
proprietary investment analysis for the fund manager (i.e., the individual
who has the ultimate responsibility for investing the entity's funds), al-
though in some cases the fund manager will serve as her own buy-side
analyst.
30. An example of a research resale service is Multex, which among other services, allows
parties to purchase historical sell-side and independent research reports. Multex.com, Inc., Annual
Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year
Ending December 31, 2002 (Form 10-K), File No. 0-24559, at 2, available at http://www.sec.gov/
edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm (last visited Feb. II, 2004).
31. A discount brokerage firm is a brokerage firm that executes securities orders at a "dis-
count" commission to full-service brokerage firms, but does not provide all of the services of a full-
service brokerage firm, such as research. It is not uncommon for discount brokerage firms to provide
to their clients the research of full-service brokerage firms for a fee.
32. See Boni & Womack, supra note 18, at 100.
Many analysts' earnings forecasts and recommendations are now readily available to the
general public. For example, the Nasdaq web site (www.nasdaq.com) currently provides
the analyst recommendations (including upgrades, downgrades, and coverage initiation)
from 90 firms for stocks listed on Nasdaq and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
updated three times a day. It also provides the consensus of analysts' recommendations
and earnings forecasts as well as lists of stocks with the largest percentage change in ana-
lyst consensus of earnings forecasts and with the highest number of analysts' earnings
revisions for the week.
Id.
33. Joseph McLaughlin, Maybe They Should Be on a Leash, but We Shouldn't Muzzle Ana-
lysts, 167 AM. BANKER 8 (2002).
[Vol. 8 1:1
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Typical characteristics of buy-side analysts include:
34
" Drawing their own conclusions on what investment decisions
should be made, which they report to their fund managers.
" Using sell-side research as an important source of information for
the stocks they research (which allows buy-side analysts to cover
more stocks than sell-side analysts) and for future investment
ideas and trends. To a lesser extent, buy-side analysts may also
consult independent analysts.35
" Conducting independent and proprietary research, which may in-
clude, among other things, talking with their own industry con-
tacts, meeting personally with company management, conducting
their own due diligence on the company, and attending investor
conferences (which are typically sponsored by sell-side firms)
where the management teams of various companies give
presentations and hold individual meetings with investors.
* Specializing in one or a few specific industry sectors (e.g., auto-
motive, media, pharmaceuticals, or telecommunications).
" Covering a limited number of stocks (typically in the range of
thirty to forty) and making investment recommendations on those
stocks only.
Research generated by buy-side analysts is solely for the benefit of
their employers and is not made available to the general public. Because
the objectives of buy-side analysts and their employers (i.e., the investing
entity) are basically aligned, buy-side analysts do not face the same con-
flicts of interest that plague sell-side analysts.
C. Independent Analysts
Like sell-side analysts, independent analysts issue research to moti-
vate third-party investors to make investment decisions. However, an
independent analyst is not linked with a particular broker or investment
bank.36 As a result, independent analysts are free from many, but not all,
34. See Fernandez, supra note 28, at 3-4; see also Michaely & Womack, supra note 28, at
657-59; Analyzing Analyst Recommendations, supra note I.
35. For a description of independent analysts, see infra Part I.C.
36. There is a good deal of debate over what constitutes "independent" research. See Larry
Diggan, Is Independence All That? Creating Independent Research Isn't as Simple as It May Sound.
And It's Not Necessarily Better Anyway, WALL ST. WEEK WITH FORTUNE, Nov. 21, 2002, at http:/
www.pbs.org/wsw/news/featurestory_20021121.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2003). It is widely
agreed that for an analyst to be deemed independent, the analyst cannot be employed by a firm with
an investment banking relationship with the covered company. See Analyzing Analyst Recommenda-
tions, supra note I. But, is an analyst that works for a brokerage firm that does not conduct any
investment banking services an independent analyst? What if the firm does not conduct investment-
banking services, but does make a market in the stock of the covered company? For purposes of this
Article, and for simplicity's sake, the author has drawn a bright-line distinction between sell-side
analysts (who work for a brokerage firm, regardless of whether the firm has an investment banking
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of the conflicts of interest that plague sell-side analysts. Much of the
purpose of the Regulatory Actions is to make sell-side research more
"independent." Independent analysts typically work for investment news-
letters or large industry research groups (such as the Gartner Group or
Forrester Research), who sell the proprietary research to institutional
clients and/or individual investors.
D. Sell-Side Analysts' Role in the Boom-Bust
Much of the recent criticism of sell-side analysts focuses on their
role in inflating the stock market's bubble and their failure to warn of the
impending burst. The United States enjoyed the longest bull market in its
history during the 1990s and through the first quarter of 2000.3 7 Much of
the growth in the stock market during this period is now attributed to the
stock market experiencing a "bubble" effect. 38 A bubble occurs when the
price for a class of items (e.g., stock) is high today because of a collec-
tive belief that the price will be even higher tomorrow, even though
"fundamental" factors do not seem to justify the price (i.e., the price has
become irrational).39
Sell-side analysts are accused of adding pressure to the bubble in a
number of different ways, including their use of questionable valuation
department or not) and independent analysts (who have no relationship with a brokerage firm or
investment bank).
37. See SHILLER, supra note 6, at 5-7.
38. Substantial bubbles (also known as speculative crazes) such as the recent stock market
crash occur periodically. Classic examples of bubbles include the Tulip-Bulb Craze of the 1600s, the
South Sea Bubble of the early 1700s, the Railroad Bubble of the late 1800s, and the Great Stock
Market Crash of 1928. The following description of bubbles is an excerpt from and essay by Art
Cashin that was reprinted by John Mauldin in his weekly newsletter, Thoughts from the Frontline E-
Letter-Conflicting Opinions, INVESTORS INSIGHT, AUG. 8, 2003, at http://www.2000wave.com
(subscription required) (on file with author).
Bubbles are booms on steroids. Instead of just being frenzied bouts of over enthusiasm,
they morph into the delusional. All caution is lost. All financial rules have been repealed.
A key ingredient in most bubbles is the concept of novelty. Usually it's a new invention
or technology. The automobile, the radio, the telephone and the like were all accompa-
nied by bubbles. One of the biggest bubbles in American history was the one involving
the beginning of the railroads. It is the novelty that promotes-"this time it's different."
The novel new technology will "change the way we live" so all the old rules have been
repealed. This "opportunity" will be a great leveler. If you and I are bright enough to
seize this opportunity, we believe we may become rich as Henry Ford, Carnegie or Van-
derbilt. (Well, maybe as rich as one of their junior partners.) To pass up such an opportu-
nity surely proves you are a fool.
Id.
39. A commonly cited measure that stock prices had lost touch with fundamentals is that P/E
(price-to-earnings) ratios reached all time highs that were far outside the historical range of P/E
ratios. See SHILLER, supra note 6, at 3-14. Shiller found that the P/E ratio for the S&P Composite
Stock Index (calculated as the real (inflation corrected) S&P Composite Index divided by the ten-
year moving average real earnings on the index) had reached approximately 44-to-I in January 2000
(the highest ratio ever), compared to the historical range of P/E ratios which largely fell between 5-
to-I and 25-to-I (although the P/E ratio did reach 33-to-I in 1929). Id. at 7-10.
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techniques to try to justify inflated company valuations, 40 overly optimis-
tic earnings forecasts,4' and their overly bullish stock recommenda-
tions.42 In short, it is argued that sell-side analysts contributed to the
bubble through their general over-optimism about the value of stocks, in
particular in the technology, telecommunications, and Internet sectors.43
The most easily documented (and also a frequently cited) indication of
this over-optimism is the incredibly disproportionate ratio of "buy" to
"sell" ratings that were issued by sell-side analysts during the bubble and
the analysts' failure to promptly correct those ratings once the bubble
burst.44 The following table sets forth the distribution of ratings by sell-
side analysts for the period from 1996 to 2001 :4
Strong Buy/Buy Hold Sell/Strong Sell
ber %% of
Year Number Total Number Total otal Number Total
1996 14,607 65.2% 7,007 31.3% 795 3.5%
1997 19,684 66.4% 8,929 30.1% 1,034 3.5%
1998 28,100 66.4% 12,754 30.1% 1,467 3.5%
1999 30,322 70.1% 11,728 27.1% 1,198 2.8%
2000 30,239 72.1% 11,037 26.3% 689 1.6%
2001 30,080 62.1% 16,615 34.3% 1,754 3.6%
Overall 153,032 67.1% 68,070 29.9% 6,937 3.0%
In order to understand these statistics, it is necessary to review how
sell-side analysts applied ratings at the time. Broken down to the most
basic level, an investor has three primary choices with respect to a given
security: (1) should she "buy" the security at the current price (e.g., the
security is currently under priced, and therefore, it will rise in value over
40. Such techniques included valuing companies on price-to-revenue ratios or on number of
hits to a web site. On many occasions the analysts simply abandoned the use of traditional valuation
techniques.
41. See infra notes 283-85 and accompanying text.
42. One author analogized the analysts' role in the euphoric rise of the stock market to that of
pied pipers, entrancing "the market with their flute work, to provide the captivating music that helps
stock rise, and rise again." COLE, supra note 4, at xi.
43. See generally COLE, supra note 4.
44. Examples of commentaries citing the disproportionate "buy" to "sell" ratings as an indica-
tion of the over-optimism of sell-side analysts include: COLE, supra note 4, at 97; Laura S. Unger,
How Can Analysts Maintain Their Independence? Speech at the Ray Garrett Jr. Corporate and
Securities Law Institute, Norwestem University School of Law (Apr. 19, 2001), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch477.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Unger Speech at
Northwestern]; John C. Bogle, Remaking the Market: Reality Bites, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2002, at
A 16.
45. Brad Barber et al., Reassessing the Returns to Analysts' Stock Recommendations, FIN.
ANALYSTS J., Mar/Apr. 2003, at 88, 90 [hereinafter Barber et al., Analysts' Recommendations].
Barber et al., employed data from First Call. Id. at 89.
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time at a rate greater than the stock market as a whole); (2) should she
"hold" the security at the current price (e.g., the security is fairly priced,
and therefore, there is no urgency to either buy or sell the security); or
(3) should she "sell" or "short ' 46 the security (e.g., the security is cur-
rently overpriced, and therefore, it will decrease in value over time)?
Given the three primary choices, it would be logical to expect ratings to
be based on these choices. Historically, that has not been the case. A
wide variety of terms are used to describe investment recommendations,
including: "buy," "sell," "strong buy," "hold," "neutral," "accumulate,"
"near-term accumulate," "long-term buy," "outperform," "market per-
form," and "market under-perform. ' 47 Because there were generally no
set definitions for what any rating meant, a fair amount of confusion re-
sulted.48 For example, a stock could be downgraded from a "buy" to an
"accumulate." What did this mean? Should an investor still buy the
stock, since accumulate appears to mean buy? Depending on the firm,
the reduction could have meant that an investor should still buy the
stock, but expect a lower return than from a "buy" rated stock, or (and
this is where things really get confusing) accumulate could be a polite
way of saying that the stock should be rated "neutral" or "hold" (e.g., the
stock is fully priced and there is no need to purchase). Of course, if the
rating had been reduced to "neutral" or "hold," that would likely have
been an indication that the stock should be sold.49 Since actual "sell"
ratings were very seldom given (many firms used "hold" to mean
"sell"),5° the "buy/sell" ratios in the above chart are substantially skewed.
Moreover, it is not unexpected for analysts to issue a preponderance
of "buy" ratings for reasons that are wholly unrelated to over-optimism.
First, there are over 14,000 stocks that are publicly traded in the United
States, and sell-side analysts cover less than 6,000 of those stocks. 5' Of
those stocks that are covered, "less than half are actively covered (mean-
46. "Selling short" is selling a security that is not currently owned by the seller. This tech-
nique is typically used when the seller believes the security price will decline. Mechanically, the
seller borrows the securities from a brokerage firm and then sells them. At some point, the seller
must purchase securities to return those she borrowed. If the securities have decreased in price, the
seller realizes a profit on this price decrease, but if the price of the securities increases, the seller will
realize a loss. A short selling strategy is also commonly used as a hedging strategy to protect a profit
in a long position.
47. Laura S. Unger, Written Testimony Concerning Conflicts of Interest Faced by Brokerage
Firms and Their Research Analysts, Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and
Government Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on Financial Services, United States House of
Representatives (July 31, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/073101 tslu.htm
(last visited Sept. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Unger Written Testimony]. At the time of the testimony,
Ms. Unger was the Acting Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. See id.
48. Id.
49. This "ratings game" is another indication of the information imbalance that exists between
institutional investors (who understand the ratings game very well) and retail investors (who gener-
ally do not).
50. Jeff D. Opdyke, Deals & Deal Makers: New Rules for Analysts-Are They Enough?,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2002, at C14.
51. Fernandez, supra note 28, at 7.
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ing covered by more than two analysts so that a basis for comparison of
analysts' opinions exists). 52 So, even with an overall recommendation
frequency of 67.1 percent strong buy/buy, only a fraction of publicly
traded stocks are receiving a "buy" rating.53 In addition, in choosing
which companies to cover, it has been shown that sell-side analysts tend
to add firms they view favorably and drop firms they view unfavorably,
rather than rate them a "sell."54 Such a tendency coincides with the ana-
lysts' role to generate investment ideas for the firm's brokerage clients. It
is generally believed that sell-side analysts have a stronger impact on
trading volume with "buy" ratings because each of the firm's clients can
act on a "buy" rating and purchase stock.55 However, only clients that
already own the particular stock (or who are interested in shorting the
stock) can react to a "sell" recommendation.56
None of this is to suggest that sell-side analysts did not fail to warn
investors of the bubble burst. Even taking into account the artful nature
of ratings and the other reasons for disproportionate "buy" recommenda-
tions, it is clear that analysts failed to warn investors and were slow to
adjust to the dramatically changed environment of the stock market.57
However, the analysis of the sell-side analyst issue should be based on
actualities, not hyperbole.58
The question then arises, what was the cause of the sell-side ana-
lysts' failures? The regulators, as well as many commentators, have fo-
cused on the conflicts of interest that plague sell-side research.
II. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST THAT PLAGUE SELL-SIDE RESEARCH
There is no doubt that conflicts of interest played a role in some of
the recent misguidance investors received from research analysts and
investment banks, although the extent of that role is not so clear. While
this Article argues that removing conflicts of interest is not the great cure
that the Regulatory Actions envision, it is important to properly under-
stand the scope of the conflicts. The following discussion is meant to
provide a detailed look at these conflicts of interest, which can be di-
vided into five basic categories: (1) brokerage activities; (2) investment
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Maureen McNichols & Patricia C. O'Brien, Self-Selection and Analyst Coverage, 35 J.
AcCT. RES. 167 (Supp. 1997).
55. Bogle, supra note 44.
56. Id. But see infra note 67, discussing a study conducted by Professor Kent L. Womack
which found that "sell" ratings may actually generate greater trading volume than "buy" ratings.
57. See generally Barber et al., Analysts' Recommendations, supra note 45.
58. An example of this hyperbole is the oft-cited statistic that in 1999, less than one percent of
stock ratings were "sells." COLE, supra note 4, at 97; see also Unger Speech at Northwestern, supra
note 44; Bogle, supra note 44.
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banking fees; (3) analyst com ensation; (4) equity stakes; and (5) pres-
sure from covered companies.
A. Brokerage Activities
To properly understand the conflicts faced by sell-side analysts, the
most important concept to remember is that sell-side research typically
generates no direct revenue for its firm. As a general rule, sell-side re-
search is not sold to investors, but rather is provided for free to the firm's
clients. 60 Since brokerage firms are for-profit entities, they came up with
different strategies to make providing free research economically sensi-
ble.
Until the mid-1970s, brokerage services were amongst the most
profitable services offered by securities firms.61 This was the era of
"fixed trading commissions." Securities trades had to go through licensed
broker-dealers and the commission charged for these transactions was set
at a fixed rate.62 Not surprisingly, the rates were set to ensure the broker-
dealers a comfortable profit margin. In that environment, with practically
guaranteed profits for brokerage services, securities firms' greatest moti-
vation was to attract and maintain active trading customers. One way that
customers were attracted and maintained, as well as encouraged to trade,
was by providing them with the firm's free proprietary research, which
was subsidized by the brokerage commissions. In 1975, the SEC put an
end to fixed-commission trading,63 which resulted in a dramatic decline
in the profitability of brokerage commissions (as broker-dealers had to
compete on commission price) and their ability to subsidize research
departments.
59. Laura S. Unger divides the conflicts slightly differently:
(I) Attracting and Retaining Clients: The analyst's firm may have underwritten an offer-
ing for a company or seek to underwrite a future offering. The analyst may have been a
part of the investment banking team that took the company public.
(2) Firm Profits: Positive reports by brokerage firm analysts can also trigger higher trad-
ing volumes, resulting in greater commissions for the firms.
(3) Compensation: An analyst's salary and bonus may be linked to the profitability of the
firm's investment banking business.
(4) Equity Stakes: The analyst, other employees, and the firm itself may own significant
positions in the companies the analyst covers. Analysts may participate in employee
stock purchase pools that invest in companies they cover or they may own stock directly.
And, in a recent trend called "venture investing," firms and analysts may acquire a stake
in a start-up company by obtaining discounted, pre-IPO shares.
Unger Written Testimony, supra note 47.
60. In the last few years many brokerage firms have begun to sell their reports to non-clients
as well through research resale services (such as Multex) and through discount brokerage firms. See
supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. Based on the author's experience at Robertson Stephens,
however, the fees generated from selling such reports are minimal.
61. COLE, supra note 4, at 45-50.
62. Id.
63. See generally Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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While firms no longer generate the profit margins from brokerage
activities that they generated in the fixed commission days, brokerage
activities can still be a very important part of the economics of a securi-
ties firm, and sell-side research can still help to generate substantial fees
for brokerage activities, primarily by issuing positive research reports.
As noted earlier, analysts are used to "selling" investment ideas to the
brokerage firm's investor clients. Since each of the firm's clients can act
on a "buy" rating and purchase stock, but only clients that already own
the particular stock (or who are interested in shorting the stock) can react
to a "sell" recommendation, analysts will typically initiate coverage on
stocks with a "buy" rating, since it is generally believed that "buy" rat-
ings are more likely to encourage trading volumes.64 Research has shown
that sell-side analyst recommendations can have a substantial impact on
both stock prices and trading volumes.65 One study found that within a
three-day period following a recommendation change, a new "buy" rec-
ommendation (either initiation or an upgrade from a lower category)
resulted in a three percent price increase for the stock, while a new "sell"
recommendation resulted in a 4.7 percent decrease. 66 In each case, a sub-
stantial increase in trading volume resulted for the stock.67
Once an analyst has issued a favorable rating, the firm's sales force
will then sell the idea to the firm's clients. After accounts have purchased
the stock, it can be very difficult for an analyst to reduce her rating on the
stock, since to do so would likely reduce the price of the stock, harming
the firm's clients who purchased it.68 To do so risks the ire of both the
firm's clients (who can take their business elsewhere) and its sales force.
Other less obvious brokerage conflicts can also pressure sell-side ana-
lysts to issue positive research. For example, firms that have favorable
ratings for a company are more likely to be awarded lucrative assign-
ments by the company to administer its stock option plan or company
buyback plan, or to conduct block sales. Finally, where a subject com-
pany is an active trader of securities, less than glowing research about the
company can lead the company to pull its trading from the offending
firm.69
64. See Bogle, supra note 44. But see infra note 67.
65. Kent L. Womack, Do Brokerage Analysts' Recommendations Have Investment Value?, 5I
J. FIN. 137 (1996).
66. Id. at 137.
67. Id. at 138. For additional information on the Womack study, see infra notes 293-97 and
accompanying text. Interestingly, the Womack Study's finding of substantially increased trading
volumes for "sell" recommendations could be an indication that brokerage firms' contention that
"buy" ratings generate greater trading volumes than "sell" ratings may be flawed and that firms
could generate meaningful brokerage revenue by encouraging sell-side analysts to find and label
"bad" companies as well as "good" companies.
68. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
69. COLE, supra note 4, at 81. Cole cites an example of NationsBank instructing its trust
officer to stop trading stocks and bonds through Kidder Peabody after an analyst at Kidder Peabody
issued a "sell" rating on NationsBank. Id.
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The conflicts between sell-side research and brokerage activities
have received substantially less press than the investment banking con-
flict and were largely ignored by the Regulatory Actions.
B. Investment Banking Fees
The conflict that has received the most attention from the press and
the regulators is the conflict that sell-side analysts face from their in-
vestment banking departments. As brokerage commissions decreased,
the costs of running "a respectable research department at a top tier
bank" did not.7° One industry commentator has estimated that cost to be
between $500 million and $1 billion per year.7' One replacement for the
inflated revenues generated by fixed commission trading has been in-
vestment-banking revenues.72
Investment banking departments generate revenue primarily by rais-
ing capital for companies (e.g., underwriting initial public offerings
("IPOs") and follow-on offerings) and by providing financial advisory
services (e.g., assisting companies with mergers and acquisitions ("M &
A") work).73 In each case, the investment banking department's ability to
generate the fees can be greatly enhanced by a cooperative research de-
partment.
1. Winning IPO Business
One of the more profitable businesses on Wall Street, until the
March 2000 stock market crash, was underwriting IpOs. 74 Winning IPO
business is very important to the revenues of an investment bank because
of both the size of the possible underwriting fees for the IPO, and be-
70. Jason Draho, Analysts' Conflict of Interest: How Are IPOs Affected?, VC EXPERTS (Jan.
14, 2003), at http://vcexperts.com (subscription required) (article on file with author).
71. Id.; see also Womack, supra note 65, at 138. Womack states that "[b]rokerage firms spend
hundreds of millions of dollars annually analyzing stocks and trying to persuade investors that cer-
tain stocks are more or less attractive than others." Id.
72. The term "investment bank" can be confusing because it encompasses both the securities
firm as a whole (e.g., Goldman Sachs is an investment bank) and one specific department within the
firm. A brokerage firm that also conducts investment-banking activity will typically be referred to as
an "investment bank."
73. More specifically, the capital raising function consists of assisting corporate and munici-
pal clients to raise money through offerings of securities (either public or private). A typical invest-
ment-banking department can perform a wide array of securities offerings, including equity securi-
ties, corporate debt securities (investment grade and non-investment grade), government debt securi-
ties (e.g., municipal bonds) and convertible securities. Underwriting IPOs is a classic example of the
capital raising function. The financial advisory function may entail both advising clients on various
financial matters (e.g., assisting a company to implement anti-takeover measures) and assisting the
client in finding and executing various business combinations (typically referred to as M&A work).
74. In an underwritten IPO, a company sells shares of its common stock to the underwriters (a
group of typically three to five investment banks) who in turn sell the shares to the public. The
investment banks generate their revenues from the deal by purchasing the shares from the issuer at a
discount (the "underwriting discount") to the price at which the shares are sold to the public.
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cause being part of the IPO can be critical to having an opportunity to
access later follow-on offering and financial advisory fees. 5
In the 1990s, research analysts became critical to an investment
bank's ability to win IPO business. Investment banks almost never com-
pete with each other based on price for underwriting business.76 There-
fore, investment banks must compete based on brand name and the qual-
ity of the services they offer.77 Since these services are often relatively
comparable in both scope and quality between the different investments
banks vying for a deal, investment banks would look for other ways to
distinguish themselves. One such way was to market the abilities of their
sell-side research analysts as an instrumental part of their pitches to win
IPO mandates. The pitch from the investment bankers would go some-
thing like this:
Our analyst is [one of] the leading analyst[s] in your sector. He is
very well respected in the industry and carries a lot of clout with in-
stitutional investors. There have been an unprecedented number of
new companies going public over the last few years, and it is critical
to the future success of your company that you have the voice of our
analyst to help to distinguish your company from all of these other
companies. You do not want your company to get lost in this mass of
new companies.
Implicit in this pitch are two very important concepts: (1) if their
investment bank is not chosen as an underwriter, their analyst will not
cover that company-irrespective of the investment merits of the com-
pany; and (2) if their investment bank is chosen as an underwriter, their
analyst will initiate coverage on the company with a "buy" rating once
the quiet period has expired. 8 If awarded the underwriting assignment,
75. See discussion infra Part 11.B.2.
76. The typical underwriting discount for an IPO is seven percent. While the underwriting
discount may vary somewhat based on the size of the deal (e.g., extremely large deals will typically
be conducted at a lesser discount), investment banks will almost never vary that percentage in order
to win business.
77. These services include: (I) distribution (e.g., finding investors to buy the company's
stock); (2) aftermarket services (e.g., stabilizing the price of the stock for a period of time after the
IPO and generally making a market in the stock); (3) positioning the company (e.g., assisting the
company to develop an investment thesis that will be used to help convince investors to purchase the
stock); (4) coordinating the process (conducting an IPO can be a daunting task and the investment
banks will help guide the company through the process); and (5) other services, such as managing
the finances of the founders and senior management, or running an employee shareholder program.
78. A basic principle of U.S. securities law is that shares distributed in lPOs are to be sold
based on the prospectus that is published in connection with the offering (which carries with it
substantial liability to the issuer, the issuer's board and some of its management, the underwriters,
and the auditors, for material misstatements or omissions in the prospectus), and not on other mar-
keting materials-in particular research reports from the firms underwriting the [P0. The quiet
period is meant to establish a period during which the primary information impacting sales of the
IPO shares is the prospectus. Research reports by analysts whose firms were involved in the [PO as
either an underwriter or dealer are prohibited from issuing research reports on the IPOed company
until the expiration of the quiet period. See infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the Regulatory Actions' impact on quiet periods.
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some sell-side analysts would also assist to "sell" the deal to investors by
speaking with potential investors during the "road show" and the "book
building" process.79
This process generated a number of possible conflicts for the sell-
side analysts. In particular: (1) analysts began to spend more of their time
looking for IPO candidates and less of their time conducting research; (2)
an analyst could ignore (or worse, disparage) a company that the analyst
felt had promising investment potential because the analyst's firm was
not named as an underwriter; and (3) an analyst could be motivated to
issue a "buy" rating on a company that the analyst believed had ques-
tionable investment potential in order to garner the investment banking
fee. This last conflict is particularly tricky since it has multiple opportu-
nities to present itself to the analyst. For example, let us assume the fol-
lowing set of facts:
" Company X is seeking to conduct an IPO and Investment Bank Y
is pitching to be one of the underwriters.
* Company X's IPO is priced at $15 per share.
* Forty days after the IPO takes place, Company X's stock is trad-
ing at $30 per share.
* Three months after the IPO takes place, Company X's stock has
risen to $50 per share.
First, a sell-side analyst may feel pressured to support a company
that the analyst does not feel should be taken public, or should not be
taken public at the valuation proposed by the analyst's investment bank.
Based on the above facts, the analyst for Investment Bank Y may be un-
comfortable with a $15 per share price for Company X, but may feel
pressured to support the deal nonetheless. Another possibility is that the
analyst may think the company is a solid IPO candidate and likes the
company at $15 per share. However, sell-side analysts are not allowed to
initiate research coverage on IPO companies that their firms underwrote
(or acted as a dealer for) until the "quiet period" has ended. Prior to the
79. The road show is the company's marketing trip to investors that takes place prior to set-
ting the actual price for the offering. It typically involves a few of the company's executive officers
who try to explain to investors why their company will make a good investment. It was not uncom-
mon for the research analysts from the underwriters to use the road show as a means to communicate
to investors their forecasts about the company's future performance. Since most investors base their
investment choices on forecasts of a company's future performance, such communications could be
critical to the success of an IPO. The book building process consists of the underwriters on the deal
collecting non-binding commitments from prospective investors. In a firm commitment underwritten
offering (which is the typical method of conducting an IPO) the issuer sells an allotment of securities
to the underwriters, who then sell the securities to investors. The underwriters bear the risk if inves-
tors choose not to purchase the securities. Due to this risk and the non-binding nature of the investor
commitments, it is very important for the success of an IPO that it be considerably over-subscribed
by investors. Analysts were used on occasion during the book building process to call particular
investors for the purpose of encouraging them to commit to buying into the IPO.
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Regulatory Actions, the quiet period for an IPO typically lasted twenty-
five calendar days from the date of the offering, but now extends to forty
days for sell-side analysts employed by the managing or co-managing
underwriters. 80 Based on the above scenario, Company X's stock price
has increased to $30 per share, which the analyst may think is too high.
The analyst may feel compelled, however, to initiate coverage with a
"buy" rating regardless. Finally, the analyst may be okay with $30 per
share, but the price continues to climb within a few months after the ana-
lyst initiated coverage. Even if the analyst thinks that $50 per share is too
high a price, the analyst may feel pressured not to lower the rating so
soon after the IPO.
2. Winning Follow-on Offering and Financial Advisory Business
Once a company has been taken public, investment banks compete
to win additional fees for follow-on offerings (e.g., additional public
offerings that take place after the IPO, such as additional common stock
offerings, convertible stock offerings, and debt offerings) and for finan-
cial advisory work (e.g., M & A work).8' Sell-side analysts can play an
important role in their firms' ability to garner these fees.
In some cases, the fees from follow-on and financial advisory busi-
ness can dwarf the fees from the original IPO. A classic example of this
phenomenon was McLeodUSA, Inc. and Salomon Smith Barney. In the
late 1990s, McLeod was considered to be a leader in the emerging com-
petitive telecommunications arena.82 While this Article is not the place to
discuss the failings of this industry segment,83 it is appropriate to point
out that the competitive telecommunications sector was coveted by in-
vestment banks because competitive telecommunication companies, col-
lectively, needed to raise hundreds of billions of dollars in order to build
next generation communication networks. Investment banks were able to
generate billions of dollars in fees from these massive capital raises in
the late 1990s. Salomon Smith Barney was the lead underwriter on
McLeod's $240 million IPO in June of 1996,84 for which Salomon Smith
80. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC. ("NASD"), Rule 2711 (f)( 1 )(A),
available at http://www.nasd.com (last visited Nov. 1, 2003); NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, INC.
("NYSE"), Rule 472(f)(1), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/rule472.pdf (last visited Nov. 8,
2003).
81. The financial advisory function typically entails services such as assisting clients in find-
ing and executing various business combinations (typically referred to as M&A work) and advising
clients on various financial matters (e.g., assisting a company to implement anti-takeover measures).
82. Yahoo! Finance, Telecommunications Services Industry Profile, at http://biz.yahoo.com/
ic/prof/42.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2003).
83. It is a common misconception that much of the current market troubles are a result of the
burst of the Internet bubble (i.e., the "dot bomb" phenomena). In reality, the decline of the Internet
sector pails in comparison to the trillions of dollars that investors lost in the collapse of the telecom-
munications sector. See Dennis K. Berman, Dialing for Dollars: Before Telecom Industry Sank,
Insiders Sold Billions in Stock-As They Cashed Out Shares, Many Executives Touted Sector's
Growth Potential-Mr. Gallucio's New Winery, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2002, at Al.
84. MCLEODUSA, INC., 1996 PROSPEcrus 424(b)(4).
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Barney generated an underwriting fee approaching $10 million. 85 As one
would expect, Salomon Smith Barney's competitive telecommunications
research analyst, Jack Grubman, initiated coverage on McLeod after the
IPO with a "buy" rating.86 McLeod was not done raising money or gen-
erating investment-banking fees. During an approximately five-year pe-
riod following the IPO, McLeod raised an additional $3.5 billion over
eight transactions.87 Salomon Smith Barney was the lead underwriter on
each of these transactions and collected almost $100 million in fees.
88
McLeod also conducted a number of acquisitions during this time period,
which also produced significant fees. 89 It was commonly understood in
the industry that for an investment bank to have any chance at such fol-
low-on or financial advisory work, it had to have a positive rating on the
company. Not surprisingly, Grubman maintained a "buy" rating on
McLeod throughout this entire fee generating process. 90 Grubman did not
reduce his rating on McLeod from "buy" until November 2001 (it was
reduced to "neutral"), 9 ' at which time McLeod's stock was trading for
less than $1.00 per share and was down approximately ninety-eight per-
cent from its high in 2000.92 McLeod filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection in January 2002. 9'
Unfortunately, the McLeod example was by no means an isolated
incident. Grumban alone has also been linked to similar practices relating
to WorldCom, Global Crossing, XO Communications, and Winstar.94
3. Investment Banking Clients v. Brokerage Clients
Broken down into its simplest terms, the increased importance of
sell-side analysts in generating investment banking fees has resulted in
sell-side analysts serving two very different audiences: brokerage clients
and investment banking clients. Each of these audiences exerts a differ-
ent pressure on the sell-side analyst. Brokerage clients want "accurate"
research that will assist them to invest profitably, while investment-
banking clients want "optimistic" research that will boost their stock
price.95 With investment banking revenues far outstripping brokerage
85. Gretchen Morgenson, Telecom's Pied Piper: Whose Side Was He On?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.






91. Yahoo! Finance, Analyst Opinion for McLeodUSA Inc., at http://biz.yahoo.com/c/mlmcld.
html (last visited Oct. 25, 2003).
92. McLeod's shares reached a split-adjusted high of $34.83 per share in March 2000. See
Morgenson, Telecom's Pied Piper, supra note 85.
93. McLeodUSA, Inc., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2001 (Form 10-K), File No. 0-20763, at
1-6, available at http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2003).
94. Gasparino, Red Flags, supra note 5.
95. Boni & Womack, supra note 18, at 94, 121.
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revenues in recent years for the most prominent firms on Wall Street,96
the fear is that their analysts, which are amongst the most high profile,
are swayed more by their investment banking audience than their broker-
age audience.
C. Analyst Compensation
Critical to understanding the impact of the brokerage and invest-
ment banking conflicts on sell-side analysts is the compensation structure
for most sell-side analysts. As with many Wall Street professionals, ana-
lysts earn a base salary plus a discretionary year-end bonus. On Wall
Street, year-end bonuses make up a substantial percentage of an em-
ployee's annual compensation, including for sell-side analysts. During
the late 1990s and the year 2000, it was not uncommon for bonuses to
constitute fifty percent or more of an employee's annual compensation.97
As a result, employees can be very motivated to satisfy whatever criteria
will allow them to maximize their year-end bonuses.
For sell-side analysts, the most important criteria in determining
their year-end bonuses have traditionally been: (1) the analyst's per-
ceived reputation with investors; and (2) the analyst's ability to generate
investment-banking fees for the firm. 98 An analyst's perceived reputation
with investors is often measured, at least in part, by the analyst's ranking
in the Institutional Investor All-American Research Team Poll ("II Rank-
ing"). II Rankings measure how well analysts are regarded by institu-
tional investors by polling investors about analysts' performance in a
number of categories including: (1) industry knowledge; (2) company
visits and conferences; (3) financial models; (4) written reports; (5) earn-
ings estimates; (6) useful and timely calls and visits; and (7) stock pick-
ing.99 The II Rankings are used as a proxy for determining whether an
analyst's research has generated brokerage commissions by motivating
investors to trade securities through the analyst's firm.100 Of note in con-
sidering how analysts are incentivized, while the forecasting and stock
picking capabilities of sell-side analysts are considered in the II Rank-
96. In 1999, major firms generated $24.6 billion in investment banking fees compared to $9.5
billion in brokerage commissions. Carolyn Sargent, The 2000 All-American Research Team,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Oct. 2000, at 72.
97. A typical compensation structure at a top-tier investment bank would be as follows: all
Vice Presidents earn a base salary of $125,000 per year, all Principals (i.e., Senior Vice Presidents)
eam a base salary of $150,000 per year, and all Managing Directors earn a base salary of $200,000.
The remainder of the employees' compensation comes from a year-end discretionary bonus. There-
fore, a research analyst who is a Principal earning $750,000 per year, generates eighty percent of
annual compensation from the bonus. A Managing Director who earns $1,500,000 per year generates
86.6 percent from the bonus.
98. See Fernandez, supra note 28, at 659-60.
99. Sargent, supra note 96, at 62.
100. Institutional investors who are pleased with the research they receive from a sell-side
analyst are more likely to send trading volume to that analyst's firm. It is an informal way for the
institutional investor to pay for the research.
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ings, they do not weigh heavily in determining the final rankings.10' It is
not unusual for the top II Ranked sell-side analysts to receive very me-
diocre stock picking and earnings forecasts ratings.
0 2
The other major factor in analysts compensation has been their abil-
ity to generate investment-banking fees. 10 3 During the late 1990s and
2000, it was well understood by sell-side analysts that the highest paid
analysts would be those who could generate significant investment bank-
ing revenues."°4
D. Equity Stakes
Over the last twenty years, it has become increasingly common for
sell-side analysts, their firms, and other investment bank employees to
own significant equity stakes in companies that are covered by the ana-
lyst.105 The practice gained substantial notoriety in the late 1970s and
1980s, when Drexel Burnham Lambert employed it.10 6 Specifically, Mi-
chael Milken (the now-infamous junk bond king) would establish in-
vestment partnerships for his key employees to purchase securities (often
high yield bonds) of the firm's clients. 10 7 Many of these investment part-
nerships turned out to be extremely profitable, and their returns allowed
Drexel to provide very lucrative employee compensation packages and
thereby attract top-level personnel. 10 8
The practice increased with the Internet boom of the late 1990s,
when access to private equity deals became a significant source of profits
for brokerage firms and their employees, including sell-side analysts. 1°9
A July 2000 Wall Street Journal report examined in detail Wall Street's
practice of investing in pre-IPO companies in the late 1990s. 110 The re-
port pointed out that venture investing had become an important part of
101. Sargent, supra note 96, at 62. A survey conducted in 2000 by Institutional Investor, which
publishes the II Rankings, "asked voters for the All-America Research Team to rate ten attributes in
order of importance in assessing the worth of an analyst or his firm .... " Id. Stock picking and
earnings estimates were ranked the seventh and fifth most important attributes, respectively. Id.
102. Thor Valdmanis, Some Widely Touted Analysts Didn't Perform So Well, USA TODAY,
Nov. 27, 2002, available at http://www.usatoday.com (archival copy available for a fee) (on file
with author).
103. See Fernandez, supra note 28, at 659-60. See generally Unger Written Testimony, supra
note 47.
104. See Fernandez, supra note 28, at 659-60. See generally Unger Written Testimony, supra
note 47.
105. See Gretchen Morgenson, Buy, They Say. But What Do They Do?, N.Y. TIMES, May 27,
2001,3-1 [hereinafter Morgenson, Buy, They Say].
106. Id.
107. See CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS' BALL 80-83, 282 (1988); Morgenson, Buy, They
Say, supra note 105.
108. See generally BRUCK, supra note 107.
109. Mark Maremont, Raising the Stakes: As Wall Street Seeks Pre-IPO Investments, Conflicts
May Arise, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2000, at AI; see Morgenson, Buy, They Say, supra note 105.
110. Maremont, supra note 109.
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the economics for the largest investment banks."' Profits from pre-IPO
investments were by no means limited to the investment banks. The
firms' senior management, investment bankers, and research analysts
were also able to reap substantial profits from this practice.' 12 It was not
unheard of for employees to generate multiple hundred-thousand dollar
gains on their pre-IPO investments." 3 In 2001, a study conducted by the
SEC confirmed the practice of analysts investing in pre-IPO compa-
nies. 14 The study found that "16 of 57 analysts reviewed" made pre-IPO
investments "in a company they later covered." ' 5
With the ability of profits from pre-IPO investments to dwarf tradi-
tional investment banking fees on occasion,"16 and the personal stakes in
these companies held by bank employees (including research analysts),
many firms focused substantial resources on pre-IPO companies. The
basic model was: (1) find a young, promising pre-IPO company; (2) in-
I I I. Id. Specifically, the report stated that:
Between 13% and 18% of Goldman's net income [in 1999] came from "private equity"
gains, primarily venture-style technology investments, compared with 4% to 5% in 1998,
according to Salomon Smith Barney analyst Guy Moszkowski. At Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc., he says, such gains jumped to between 17% and 22% in [the] first quarter
[of 2000], from about 4% of net income for [1999]; much of the increase came from a
huge windfall in VerticalNet Inc., a provider of online business-to-business trading sites
that Lehman invested in and then took public.
Id. The report also included a number of specific examples of pre-lPO investments that generated
astronomical returns, such as:
COMPANY STOCK BANK'S
BANK PRE-IPO REITRD RECOM-REGISTERED RCM
INVESTED STAKE MENDATION
IN FOR SALE AT THE TIME
Morgan Stanley Vignette Corp. $1.5 million $41 million** Outperform
Dean Witter
Chase H&Q Infospace $2 million $69 million*** Buy
Lehman Brothers VerticalNet $2 million $238 million Buy
FleetBoston**** Internet Capi- $4 million $137 million Buy/Strong Buy
tal Group $4_million $137_million Buy/StrongBuy
*Approximate value of shares that bank registered to sell, or sold.
**Represents half of stake sold; other half worth currently worth [sic] about $26 million.
***Includes shares registered by H&Q, an H&Q employee fund and an H&Q
limited partnership.
****Shares owned by BancBoston Investments unit; ratings by Robertson Stephens.
Id.
112. Employee investments were typically made through employee venture pools that were
established by the investment banks, but were also made on occasion through individual invest-
ments. While these investments were often very lucrative, they could also result in substantial
losses-in particular for employees who made pre-IPO investments in 2000.
113. See generally Morgenson, Buy, They Say, supra note 105.
114. Unger Written Testimony, supra note 47.
115. Id.; see also Laura S. Unger, Oral Testimony Concerning Conflicts of Interest Faced by
Brokerage Firms and Their Research Analysts, Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insur-
ance and Government Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on Financial Services, United States House
of Representatives (July 31, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/0730lortslu.
htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Unger Oral Testimony].
116. Classic examples include Goldman Sachs' $36 million pre-IPO investment in Stor-
ageNetworks Inc., which was valued at approximately $1.6 billion in July 2000, Maremount, supra
note 109, and CIBC Oppenheimer's $30 million pre-IPO investment in Global Crossing Ltd., which
was valued at approximately $4.6 billion in March 1999, CoLE, supra note 4, at 58.
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vest in the company; (3) take the company public; and (4) shortly there-
after, sell the holdings in the newly public company for a substantial
profit. Because investment banks can play an important role in determin-
ing whether or not a private company is ready to go public, there is con-
cern that in the late 1990s the investment banks failed in this gate-
keeping role because the banks and their employees (including research
analysts) were more motivated to liquidate their investments in pre-IPO
companies than they were in bringing quality companies to public inves-
tors. 7
In addition, two interrelated problems regarding sell-side analysts'
ratings and pre-IPO investments have recently come to light: (1) research
analysts issuing "buy" or "strong buy" ratings on a stock while the ana-
lyst, the analyst's firm, and the firm's employees, were selling the stock;
and (2) "booster shots."'"18 After making pre-IPO investments, the ana-
lyst, the investment bank, and the other employees who invested, typi-
cally look for an opportunity to sell these shares for a profit. A common
liquidity event in the late 1990s for such a pre-IPO investment was to sell
the shares in the open market after an IPO. Once the IPO has taken place,
there is a public market for the securities, which makes sales substan-
tially easier, and often at a price substantially above the pre-IPO price.
These sales could begin six months after the IPO takes place, following
expiration of the customary lock-up agreements. 19 It was not uncommon
for the analyst, the analyst's firm, and the employees of the firm, to sell
most or all of their shares within days or weeks after the expiration of the
lock-ups. While these sales were taking place, the analyst's rating on the
stock would often be a "buy" or a "strong buy." 120 A number of non-
manipulative reasons can be given for this practice, including: (1) a dif-
ferent investment discipline for private equity investing, where it is not
uncommon to formulaically liquidate private equity investments once a
company has gone public, irrespective of the possible upside; and (2) the
need for individual employees to make personal financial decisions re-
gardless of the current rating. Nevertheless, the whole process lends to
the perception of a severe conflict and has generated substantial criti-
cism.
117. See generally COLE, supra note 4, at 58.
118. Unger Written Testimony, supra note 47; see also Unger Oral Testimony, supra note 115.
For an explanation of "booster shots," see infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
119. Underwriters for an IPO will typically require all of the major shareholders, employees of
the company, or any other "interested-party" shareholders, to enter into "lock-ups" that restrict such
shareholders from selling any of their shares of the company for at least six months from the date of
the IPO.
120. See Morgenson, Buy, They Say, supra note 105; see also Maremount, supra note 109.
Investment banks cited as having conducted this practice included Chase H&Q (since merged into
J.P. Morgan Securities), CS First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, and
Robertson Stephens. See Morgenson, Buy, They Say, supra note 105.
121. See Morgenson, Buy, They Say, supra note 105.
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The question has also been raised whether some research analysts
issued "booster-shot" research reports. 22 A booster-shot is a favorable
research report that is issued shortly before the expiration of the lock-
ups, with the purpose of running up the price of the stock, so that insiders
can sell into a more favorable market once the lock-ups are lifted. 123 In-
siders that can benefit from this practice include the analyst, the invest-
ment bank, and the investment bank's employees (as noted above), as
well as venture capital investors in the company. It should be noted that
venture capital firms can play a very significant role in the appointment
of an investment bank as the underwriter or financial advisor for a
deal. 24 In 2001, a study conducted by the SEC found that "in 26 of 97
lock-ups reviewed, research analysts may have issued 'booster shot' re-
ports."
25
E. Pressure from Covered Companies
It may be the least publicized of the conflicts, but pressure on ana-
lysts by covered companies is by no means a minor matter. Research
analysts depend upon access to the management of the companies they
cover for a substantial portion of the information they use to generate
their analysis. 26 If the company's management is upset with an analyst
over unfavorable research coverage, that analyst may be "shut out of
mailings, meetings, conference calls and gatherings of the [company] ...
.,,127 A recent survey by Reuters Institutional Investor Survey Group
found that analysts "express strong concern over punitive corporate reac-
tions to any negative commentary."'' 28 In response to this conflict, and
separate from what this Article refers to as the Regulatory Actions, the
SEC has requested the NASD and the NYSE to consider drafting new
122. Unger Written Testimony, supra note 47; Unger Oral Testimony, supra note 115.
123. See NASAA Comment Letter to the SEC Secretary Johnathan Katz Regarding SEC Re-
lease 34-45526 on Research Analysts Conflicts of Interest (April 18, 2002), available at http://www.
nasaa.org/nasaa/scripts/fu-display-list.asp?ptid=1 5 (last visited Nov. 3, 2003). Insiders also benefit
if the research report is able to increase trading volume since the insiders will typically be owners of
restricted stock, which can only be sold in limited volume increments, based on a percentage of the
recent trading volume. The greater the recent trading volume, the more shares that can be sold. See
generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e) (2003).
124. Venture capital investors will often have representatives serving on the company's board
of directors, which is ultimately responsible for appointing the underwriters for the IPO. Since the
venture capital directors are typically the most experienced directors regarding the IPO process, it is
not unusual for them to have the dominant voice in choosing the underwriters.
125. Unger Oral Testimony, supra note 115; see also Unger Written Testimony, supra note 47.
126. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 184 (2003).
127. Michael Siconolfi, Incredible 'Buys': Many Companies Press Analysts to Steer Clear of
Negative Ratings-Stock Research Is Tainted as Naysayers Are Banned, Undermined and Berated-
Small Investors in the Dark, WALL ST. J., July 19, 1995, at Al.
128. REUTERS INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR RESEARCH GROUP, THE U.S. EQUITIES INVESTMENT
REPORT (2002).
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III. THE NEW REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
Historically, sell-side analysts have been a relatively lightly regu-
lated group on Wall Street. 30 They are regulated by a number of diverse
bodies of law, including the federal securities laws,' 31 NASD regulations,
and NYSE regulations. In general, regulations of sell-side analysts have
tended toward broad principles of propriety by the analysts, rather than
detailed, technical requirements. Such regulations include a prohibition
against insider trading, and general anti-fraud prohibitions. 32 Until 2001,
the major reforms regarding sell-side analysts had focused on the ability
of these analysts to garner material, non-public information from com-
pany insiders, which resulted in the adoption of Regulation Fair Disclo-
sure ("Regulation FD") in 2000.131
In 2001, however, a very negative spotlight began to show brightly
on sell-side analysts, with particular focus on their conflicts of interest:
e In spring 2001, a former Merrill Lynch investor filed a NYSE ar-
bitration claim against Merrill Lynch and Henry Blodget (the
firm's star Internet analyst), 134 over Mr. Blodget's stock recom-
129. Deborah Solomon & Robert Frank, Stock Analysis: 'You Don't Like Our Stock? You Are
Off the List'-SEC Sets New Front on Conflicts By Taking Aim at Companies That Retaliate Against
Analysts, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2003, at Cl.
130. Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regulation
of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1038 (2003). Professors Fisch and Sale note that "in some re-
spects, analysts have enjoyed preferred status under the federal securities laws. Courts carved out an
analyst exception to the prohibition on the use of nonpublic information in securities trading ... 
Id.
131. In particular, the Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa), and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm).
132. Most notably due to Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2003).
133. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100 to 243.103 (2003). Regulation FD, which took effect in October
2000, is aimed at eliminating the practice of selective disclosure. Subject to certain limited excep-
tions, Regulation FD prohibits the former practice of company officials selectively disclosing mate-
rial nonpublic information to certain research analysts (or institutional investors) prior to, or rather
than, disclosing the information to the market as a whole. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100. Under Regulation
FD, all investors are to have access to the same information at the same time. Id.
134. Mr. Blodget came to fame in late 1998 when, as an analyst at CIBC Oppenheimer, he
made the now infamous call that Amazon.com's stock, then trading at $243 per share, would trade at
$400 per share within twelve months. The stock exceeded the $400 per share mark within three
weeks and much of the credit was given to Mr. Blodget and his call. Mr. Blodget became one of the
most celebrated analysts on Wall Street and was soon hired by Merrill Lynch to head its Internet
research group. Background information is helpful in understanding the boldness of Mr. Blodget's
call. At the time of the call, Amazon was one of the early Internet darlings and was trading at a very
high level. Amazon had never earned a profit at the time (and was not forecasted to earn a profit for
another five years), and yet at $240 per share, the company had a market capitalization of approxi-
mately $27 billion. A $400-per-share price translated into a market capitalization of approximately
$45 billion. It should also be noted that only two months earlier Mr. Blodget's price target for Ama-
zon was $150. See generally COLE, supra note 4, at 70-73.
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mendation of InfoSpace, Inc. ("InfoSpace"). 35 The investor as-
serted, among other things, that Mr. Blodget provided overly op-
timistic projections for InfoSpace, because they would boost
Merrill Lynch's investment banking business, and consequently
Mr. Blodget's compensation. 36 Merrill Lynch defended Mr.
Blodget's research, but ended up settling with the investor for a
reported $400,000.137
" During the spring and summer of 2001, the SEC "conducted on-
site examinations of full-service" brokerage firms, focusing on
the conflicts of interest of sell-side analysts.138
* In early summer 2001, largely in response to the Merrill
Lynch/Henry Blodget NYSE arbitration, the Office of the Attor-
ney General of the State of New York, led by Eliot Spitzer, com-
menced an investigation into stock recommendations issued by
research analysts at Merrill Lynch. 39 The investigation focused
on stocks covered by the Internet research analysts at Merrill
Lynch, including most notably Mr. Blodget.' 4°
" On July 13, 2001, the SEC issued an Investor Alert on research
analysts, which warned investors of the substantial conflicts of in-
terest under which analysts operate.141
" During the summer of 2001, the U.S. House of Representatives
Financial Services Committee's Subcommittee on Capital Mar-
kets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises held
hearings on research analysts. 42 Most notably, on July 31, 2001,
Laura S. Unger, Acting Chair of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, testified before the subcommittee on the results of
135. Charles Gasparino, Deals & Deal Makers: All-Star Analyst Faces Arbitration After Inter-
net Picks Hit the Skids, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2001, at C 18.
136. Id. Specifically, Merrill Lynch was acting as financial advisor to Go2Net, Inc., another
Internet company, which was in the process of being acquired by InfoSpace. Id. Merrill Lynch's fee
for its financial advisor work was contingent upon the acquisition closing and a decrease in the stock
price of InfoSpace would have jeopardized the acquisition. Id. As a result, Mr. Blodget may have
been motivated to issue overly positive research on InfoSpace, or, in the alternative, refrain from
issuing negative research.
137. Charles Gasparino, Merrill Is Paying in Wake of Analyst's Call on Tech Stock, WALL ST.
J., July 20, 2001, at CI.
138. Unger Written Testimony, supra note 47; see also Unger Oral Testimony, supra note 115.
139. Affidavit of Eric Dinallo, Assistant Attorney General of the State of New York, in Sup-
port of Application for an Order Pursuant to General Business Law § 354, at 2, available at http://
www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/MerrillL.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Dinallo
Affidavit]. The Dinallo Affidavit is often incorrectly referred to in the media as being the affidavit of
Eliot Spitzer.
140. Id. at 2.
14 I. Analyzing Analyst Recommendations, supra note I.
142. See Unger Oral Testimony, supra note 115.
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the on-site SEC examinations, which found many of the conflicts
cited in Part II of this Article.
143
Through the summer of 2001, the financial press began to focus
substantial criticism on research analysts due to their perceived
influence on the now collapsed stock market bubble, and numer-
ous lawsuits were filed against Wall Street's research analysts and
their investment banks.144
In response to this mounting pressure, a number of prominent in-
vestment banks unilaterally adopted new internal policies to curb the
perceived impact of conflicts of interest, including Goldman Sachs re-
quiring that its analysts disclose "their ownership in companies they
cover," and Merrill Lynch and CS First Boston banning their "analysts
from buying shares of companies they cover."'' 45 The Securities Industry
Association ("SIA") and the Association for Investment Management
and Research ("AIMR"), advocacy groups for the securities industries,
also jumped into the fray by publishing a best practices piece 46 and an
issues paper 147 on equity research, respectively. None of these self-
regulatory measures proved to be sufficient, and the regulators continued
to move forward.
A. Overview of the Regulatory Actions
An outgrowth of all this attention on research analysts has been four
major regulatory actions aimed at changing the way sell-side analysts
operate: (1) Section 501 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act; 148 (2) new NASD
and NYSE Analyst Independence Rules; (3) the SEC's Regulation Ana-
lyst Certification; and (4) the regulatory settlement with Wall Street.
143. Unger Written Testimony, supra note 47. Examples of the conflicts found in the SEC
examinations included: (1) the line between research and investment banking was badly blurred; (2)
analysts' relationships with the companies they followed was cozy; (3) use of "'booster shot' re-
search reports close to the expiration of lock-up periods;" and (4) stock ownership in covered com-
panies by sell-side analysts and other employees of the brokerage firm, and a practice of those indi-
viduals selling the stock while the analyst maintained a "buy" rating. Id. Ms. Unger also found that
firms with internal policies against some of these problems were not followed. Id. Finally, Ms.
Unger expressed concern that firms used a variety of undefined terms to describe their investment
recommendations and that such practice may be confusing to investors. Id.
144. Randall Smith & Jerry Markon, Heard on the Street: Note to Suers of Analysts: Rough
RoadAhead, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2001, at Cl. For a discussion of the potential liability of sell-side
analysts, see Jill 1. Gross, Securities Analysts' Undisclosed Conflicts of Interest: Unfair Dealing or
Securities Fraud?, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 631 (2002).
145. Jeff D. Opdyke, Deals & Deal Makers: Goldman Analysts Must Disclose Ownership,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 200 1, at C17.
146. In June 2001, the SIA "formally adopted Best Practices For Research." Securities Industry
Association, Inc. (SIA), Analysts Integrity: Background, available at http://www.sia.com/analyst-
integrity (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
147. On July I1, 2001, the AIMR issued a report on analyst objectivity. Press Release, The
Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR), Global Investment Association
AIMR Issues Report on Analyst Objectivity (July 1I, 2001), available at http://www.aimr.com/
pressroom/0 releases/0 I rpt-objectivity.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
148. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 8, at § 501 (codified as new § 15D of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6 (2002)).
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1. Section 501 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
The recently adopted Sarbanes-Oxley Act 149 includes a Section 501
(which has been codified as a new Section 15D of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934) which requires that the SEC directly, or through a
registered securities association or national securities exchange (e.g., the
NASD and the NYSE), adopt "rules reasonably designed to address con-
flicts of interest that can arise when securities analysts recommend equity
securities in research reports and public appearances .... ,,150 The rule-
making required by Section 15D of the Securities Exchange Act has been
accomplished by the NASD and the NYSE through their enactment of
the new analyst independence rules.'
51
2. New NASD and NYSE Analyst Independence Rules
The most fundamental of the Regulatory Actions taken in response
to the research analyst issue is the enactment by the NASD and the
NYSE of detailed regulations that address both the activities of research
analysts and their firms. On May 10, 2002, the SEC approved new rules
by the NASD and the NYSE "to address conflicts of interest that are
raised when research analysts recommend securities in public communi-
cations."'' 52 The primary regulatory changes involved the NASD adopt-
ing a new Rule 2711 and the NYSE substantially amending its Rules 351
149. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is a very broad-reaching securities and auditing reform package
that was adopted by Congress in response to the many accounting and corporate scandals that rocked
the U.S. capital markets in 2001 and 2002. See William S. Duffey, Jr., Corporate Fraud and Ac-
countability: A Primer on Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 54 S.C. L. REV. 405, 406 (2002). The Sar-
banes-Oxley Act includes Section 501 which addresses research-analyst conflicts of interest. Sar-
banes-Oxley Act, supra note 8, at § 501.
150. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 8, at § 501; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15D
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-6 (2002)). Specifically, § 15D(a) requires that rules be adopted that are
designed, among other things:
(I) to improve public confidence in securities research, and to protect the objectivity and
independence of securities analysts, by (a) restricting the prepublication clearance of
research by investment bankers, (b) prohibiting investment bankers from supervising
or participating in the compensatory evaluation of analysts, and (c) preventing retalia-
tion against an analyst for writing negative research reports that could harm present or
prospective investment banking relationships;
(2) to establish appropriate blackout periods during which firms who have acted as, or are
to act as, underwriters or dealers in a public offering of securities for a company may
not distribute research on that company; and
(3) to establish structural and institutional safeguards to separate research analysts from
the review, pressure, or oversight of investment banking.
Id. Section 15D(b) requires that rules be adopted that require more detailed disclosure from firms in
research reports and research analysts in public appearances regarding conflicts of interest. Id.
151. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Announces Approval of SRO
Rules Addressing Research Analyst Conflicts of Interest (July 29, 2003), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-89.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2003).
152. NASD and NYSE Rulemaking, Exchange Act Release No. 34-45908, 67 Fed. Reg.
34,968 (May 10, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-45908.htm (last visited Nov. 4,
2003) [hereinafter SEC Release No. 34-45908]. The NYSE and the NASD are each self-regulated
organizations ("SROs") that are subject to oversight by the SEC. See id. These SROs are charged
with developing the rules for the functioning of their organizations. See id. However, the SEC retains
certain oversight powers over the rulemaking of the SROs. See id.
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and 472 (collectively, the "New NASD/NYSE Analyst Regulations"). A
number of amendments were subsequently proposed by the NASD and
the NYSE, and eventually approved by the SEC on July 29, 2003.'
3. Regulation Analyst Certification
The SEC adopted Regulation Analyst Certification 54 ("Regulation
AC"), which took effect on April 14, 2003.155 Regulation AC requires
that specific certifications be made in connection with research reports
and public appearances.156 While not directly part of the rules required by
Section 501 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Regulation AC addresses some
of the same issues (including, most notably, its goal to promote the integ-
rity of, and restore investor confidence in, research reports) and is meant
to complement the New NASD/NYSE Analyst Regulations.
157
4. The Regulatory Settlement with Wall Street
The $1.4 billion global settlement with ten of the leading firms on
Wall Street has been, in many ways, the driver that spurred on the ac-
complishment of each of the other Regulatory Actions. In June 2001,
largely in response to a NYSE arbitration claim filed against Merrill
Lynch and its star Internet analyst Henry Blodget,15 8 the Office of the
Attorney General of the State of New York, led by Elliot Spitzer, com-
menced an investigation into stock recommendations issued by the Inter-
net research analysts at Merrill Lynch. 159 Largely on the basis of a mas-
sive review of Merrill Lynch's internal e-mails,' 6° the New York Attor-
ney General's office filed an affidavit in New York state court that
charged Merrill Lynch with violations of the Martin Act' 61 for issuing
misleading stock ratings because:
153. SEC Release No. 34-48252, supra note 9.
154. 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.500 to 242.505 (2003).
155. Regulation AC Press Release, supra note 9.
156. 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.501 to 242.502.
157. Regulation AC Press Release, supra note 9.
158. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
159. Dinallo Affidavit, supra note 139, at 2.
160. The e-mail records purport to demonstrate: (1) the analysts' investment-banking motiva-
tions; and (2) that Merrill Lynch's positive public support of certain stocks was contradicted by
contemporaneous private e-mail messages that showed the analysts' true, negative feelings about the
stocks. Id. at 10-13. The Dinallo Affidavit charged that while analysts were publishing positive
ratings on certain stocks, those same analysts were describing such stocks in private as "powder
keg," "piece of junk," "piece of crap," and "piece of shit." Id. at 12-13.
161. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352 (McKinney 2003). Spitzer's authority to investigate and bring
charges (both criminal and civil) against Merrill Lynch stemmed from the Martin Act. Id.
The Martin Act proscribes a wide array of practices in connection with the sale of securi-
ties. It prohibits and makes illegal any fraud, misrepresentation, deception, concealment,
promise or representation that is beyond reasonable expectation while engaged in the is-
suance, distribution, investment advice, sale or purchase of securities within and from the
State of New York .... Unlike the federal securities laws, no purchase or sale of stock is
required, nor are intent, reliance, or damages required elements of a violation.
Dinallo Affidavit, supra note 139, at 7.
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(1) the ratings in many cases did not reflect the analysts' true opin-
ions of the companies; (2) as a matter of undisclosed, internal policy,
no "reduce" or "sell" recommendations were issued, thereby convert-
ing a published five-point rating scale into a de facto three-point sys-
tem; and (3) Merrill Lynch failed to disclose to the public that Merrill
Lynch's ratings were tarnished by an undisclosed conflict of interest:
the research analysts were acting as quasi-investment bankers for the
companies at issue, often initiating, continuing, and/or manipulating
research coverage for the purpose of attracting and keeping invest-
ment banking clients, thereby producing misleading ratings that were
neither objective nor independent, as they purported to be. 162
The affidavit also charged that Merrill Lynch's compensation sys-
tem, under which analysts knew their compensation would be impacted
by the investment banking business they generated, was a significant
factor contributing to the misleading ratings.'
63
As a result of Spitzer's investigation, Merrill Lynch entered into a
$100 million settlement with the New York Attorney General's office in
May 2002.164 Under the settlement, Merrill Lynch agreed, among other
things, to pay a $100 million penalty1 65 and to institute a number of re-
forms in the way it conducts research that have been largely subsumed
by the subsequent global settlement. 1
66
In spring 2002, Spitzer broadened the investigation to include the
activities of several additional financial institutions and their research
analysts.167 The SEC, the NASD, the NYSE, the NASAA, and other state
regulators joined in on these broadened investigations, which eventually
led to the April 2003 global settlement among the SEC, the New York
Attorney General's Office, NASAA, the NASD, the NYSE, and the
following ten investment banks (collectively, the "Ten Investment
Banks"): 168
162. Id. at 3.
163. Id. at 4.
164. Agreement Between the Attorney General of the State of New York and Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (May 21, 2002), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/invest-
ors/merrill_agreement.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2003). While Merrill Lynch neither admitted nor
denied the specific charges brought against it by the New York Attorney General's Office, it did
issue a statement of contrition, whereby Merrill Lynch publicly apologized to its "clients, sharehold-
ers and employees for the inappropriate communications brought to light by the New York State
Attorney General's investigation." Id. at Exhibit B; see also id. at 2-3, 1I. Merrill Lynch went on to
express its sincere "regret that there were instances in which certain of our Internet sector research
analysts expressed views which at certain points may have appeared inconsistent with Merrill
Lynch's published recommendations." Id. at Exhibit B.
165. The $100 million was divided as follows: $48 million to New York State; $50 million to
the other forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, and $2 million to the NASAA.
Id. at 12.
166. See supra note 164; see also Final Judgments, infra note 168.
167. Dinallo Affidavit, supra note 139, at 2.
168. SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., No. 03 Civ. 2937 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/judgl8lO9.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003); SEC v. Citi-
group Global Mkts. Inc. f/k/a Salomon Smith Barney Inc., No. 03 Civ. 2945 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28,
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1. Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc. ("Bear Stearns");
2. Citigroup Global Markets Inc. f/k/a Salomon Smith Barney Inc.
("SSB");
3. Credit Suisse First Boston LLC ("CSFB");
4. Goldman, Sachs & Co. ("Goldman");
5. J.P. Morgan Securities Inc. ("J.P. Morgan");
6. Lehman Brothers Inc. ("Lehman");
7. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Incorporated ("Merrill
Lynch");
8. Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated ("Morgan Stanley");
9. UBS Warburg LLC ("UBS"); and
10. U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray Inc. ("Piper Jaffray").
The collective regulators alleged that each of the ten firms "engaged
in acts and practices that created or maintained inappropriate influence
by investment banking over research analysts, thereby imposing conflicts
of interest on research analysts that the firms failed to manage in an ade-
quate or appropriate manner. In addition, the regulators found supervi-
sory deficiencies at every firm."'169 These violations were neither admit-
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/judg 1811.htm (last visited Oct. 31,
2003); SEC v. Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, No. 03 Civ. 2946 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/judg18110.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003); SEC v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 03 Civ. 2944 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.
gov/litigation/litreleases/judgl8ll3.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003); SEC v. J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc.,
No. 03 Civ. 2939 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litre-
leases/judgl8l14.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003); SEC v. Lehman Brothers Inc., No. 03 Civ. 2940
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/judgl8ll6.htm (last
visited Oct. 31, 2003); SEC v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 2941
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/judgl8ll5.htm (last
visited Oct. 31, 2003); SEC v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 03 Civ. 2948 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003),
available at http://www.sec.govIlitigation/litreleases/judgl8ll7.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003);
SEC v. UBS Warburg LLC, No. 03 Civ. 2946 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.
sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/judgl8 112.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003); SEC v. U.S. Bancorp Piper
Jaffray Inc., No. 03 Civ. 2942 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.govlitigation/
litreleases/judgl8l18.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter, collectively, Final Judgments].
Regulators also reached individual settlements with Henry Blodget and Jack Grubman for their roles
in issuing fraudulent research. Joint Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, National
Association of Securities Dealers and New York Stock Exchange, The Securities and Exchange
Commission, NASD and the New York Stock Exchange Permanently Bar Henry Blodget From the
Securities Industry and Require $4 Million Payment (Apr. 28, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2003-56.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003); Joint Press Release, Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, New York Attorney General's Office, National Association of Securities Dealers and New
York Stock Exchange, The Securities and Exchange Commission, New York Attorney General's
Office, NASD and the New York Stock Exchange Permanently Bar Jack Grubman and Require $15
Million Payment (Apr. 28, 2003), at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-55.htm (last visited Oct.
31, 2003). Neither admitting nor denying the charges against them, the former star analysts agreed to
be censured and permanently barred from the securities industry, and Blodget agreed to pay a $4
million penalty while Grubman agreed to pay a $15 million penalty. Id.
169. Press Release on Global Settlement, supra note 9.
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ted nor denied by the various firms."7 The regulators also charged a
number of additional specific violations against certain firms. '
7
'
Taking the Merrill Lynch settlement as a beginning template, the
global settlement was negotiated between the regulators and the ten in-
vestment banks. 72 Under the global settlement, the Ten Investment
Banks agreed to pay a collective $1.3875 billion as follows: (1) $487.5
million in penalties (including the $100 million that Merrill Lynch paid
in its May 2002 settlement); (2) $387.5 million in disgorgement; (3)
$432.5 million to fund independent research; and (4) $80 million to pro-
170. Id.
171. Id. Specifically, the regulators charged that:
CSFB, Merrill Lynch and SSB issued fraudulent research reports in violation of Section
15(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as well as various state statutes; Bear
Steams, CSFB, Goldman, Lehman, Merrill Lynch, Piper Jaffray, SSB and UBS Warburg
issued research reports that were not based on principles of fair dealing and good faith
and did not provide a sound basis for evaluating facts, contained exaggerated or unwar-
ranted claims about the covered companies, and/or contained opinions for which there
were no reasonable bases in violation of NYSE Rules 401, 472 and 476(a)(6), and NASD
Rules 2110 and 2210 as well as state ethics statutes; [and] UBS Warburg and Piper Jaf-
fray received payments for research without disclosing such payments in violation of
Section 17(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 as well as NYSE Rules 476(a)(6), 401 and
472 and NASD Rules 2210 and 2110. Those two firms, as well as Bear Steams, J.P.
Morgan and Morgan Stanley, made undisclosed payments for research in violation of
NYSE Rules 476(a)(6), 401 and 472 and NASD Rules 2210 and 2110 and state statutes.
Id. The global settlement also charged two firms (CSFB and SSB) with "spinning" of "hot" IPO
allocations. Id. "Spinning" was a practice by which an investment bank would grant shares in a
particularly hot IPO to select senior executives in exchange for investment banking business from
the executives' companies. Press Release, National Association of Securities Dealers, NASD
Charges Frank Quattrone with Spinning, Undermining Research Analyst Objectivity, Failure to
Cooperate in Investigation (Mar. 6, 2003), at http://www.nasdr.com/news/pr2003/release 03_010.
html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003). At a time when the share price of a hot IPO could double, triple, or
increase by even more in a single day, obtaining access to hot IPOs could net an individual multiple
millions of dollars. See id. This Article does not address the spinning portion of the global settle-
ment.
172. Randall Smith & Deborah Solomon, State-Level Stock Cops Retain Power, WALL ST. J.,
July 25, 2003, at C 1.
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mote investor education. 173 In addition to the monetary payments, the
global settlement imposes on the Ten Investment Banks a number of
significant reforms that are in addition to the requirements of the New
NASD/NYSE Analyst Regulations and Regulation AC. 17 4 These re-
quirements are applicable only to the Ten Investment Banks. 75 Specifi-
cally, the global settlement requires the Ten Investment Banks: (1) to
make additional structural reforms to separate research from investment
banking; (2) to render additional disclosures; (3) to provide independent
research to their clients for a period of five years; and (4) to pay for an
investor education fund. 1
7 6
It does not appear that the global settlement 177 has ended the regula-
tory investigation of the sell-side analyst issue. 78 There is still a possibil-
ity that regulatory actions will be taken against additional firms and ana-
lysts. 179 Moreover, the regulators have recently signaled an intent to ex-
173. Press Release on Global Settlement, supra note 9. The payments by individual firm are as
follows:
InvestorsIndependent Education Toa
Penalty Disgorgement Research Total
Firm ($ Millions) ($ Millions) ($ Millions) ($ Mil- ($Millions)lions)
Bear Steams 25 25 25 5 80
CSFB 75 75 50 0 200
Goldman 25 25 50 10 110
J.P. Morgan 25 25 25 5 80
Lehman 25 25 25 5 80
Merrill 100* 0 75 25 200
Lynch
Morgan 25 25 75 0 125
Stanley
Piper Jaffray 12.5 12.5 7.5 0 32.5
SSB 150 150 75 25 400
UBS 25 25 25 5 80
TotalTt ns) 487.5 387.5 432.5 80 $1,387.5($ Millions
*Payment made in prior settlement of research analyst conflicts of interest with the states securities
regulators.
Id. Of the $875 million of penalties and disgorgement, $100 million was previously paid by Merrill
Lynch in its May 2002 settlement and was apportioned at that time. See supra note 165 and accom-
panying text. The remaining $775 million is to be paid by the firms other than Merrill Lynch, and
one-half of this amount will be placed into "Distribution Funds" to benefit customers of the firms.
See Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Fact Sheet on Global Analyst Research Settlements,
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003) [hereinafter SEC Fact
Sheet]. The remaining $387.5 million will be paid to the states. Id. A court-appointed and SEC-
recommended Distribution Fund Administrator, will administer the Distribution funds. Id. "The
Distribution Fund Administrator will formulate a plan to distribute the funds in an equitable, cost-
effective manner to customers who purchased the equity securities of companies referenced in the
complaint against the firm through which the customer bought the securities." Id.
174. See Press Release on Global Settlement, supra note 9.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Including the individual settlements with Blodget and Grubman. See supra note 168.
178. See Susanne Craig & Randall Smith, Stock Analysis: A New Probe Targets Bosses On
Wall Street-Regulators Are Facing Pressure to Pursue Executive Wrongdoing In Stock-Research
Investigations, WALL ST. J., June 3, 2003, at Cl.
179. Id.
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pand the scope of their research analyst inquiry to include "research ex-
ecutives, investment bankers and chief executive officers" of a number
of major Wall Street firms. 180 This expanded inquiry has been reported as
focusing on high ranking individuals and their role in influencing the
production of tainted research. 
18
B. Fundamental Changes Sought by the Regulatory Actions
Taken as a whole, the Regulatory Actions seek to make five funda-
mental changes to the way that sell-side research is conducted (in addi-
tion to the punishment function of the global settlement): 82 (1) clearly
separate sell-side research from investment banking; (2) restrict personal
trading of analysts in the companies they cover; (3) require analysts to
certify their research; (4) increase disclosure requirements for research;
and (5) require certain firms to provide independent research to their
clients.
1. Clearly Separate Sell-Side Research from Investment Banking
By far the most publicized function of the Regulatory Actions has
been its goal to clearly separate sell-side research from the influences of
investment banking. This separation is to be achieved primarily by rein-
forcing the Chinese Wall that separates research from investment bank-
ing and by implementing rules that prevent firms from promising favor-
able research in exchange for investment banking fees.
a. Reinforce the Chinese Wall that separates research from
investment banking
Traditionally, the term "Chinese Wall" has been used to describe
the internal procedures that an investment bank must establish to prevent
its investment bankers from sharing material, non-public information
about the firm's publicly-traded investment banking clients with other
departments within the firm (e.g., the firm's sales and trading department
and research department), in order to prevent insider trading. 83 The term
180. Id. According to the Wall Street Journal, the SEC, NASD, and NYSE sent out in late May
2003 information requests (including a request to review e-mails) to "more than 50 research execu-
tives, investment bankers and chief executive officers" of major Wall Street firms. Id. The Wall
Street Journal reported that the following Wall Street CEOs received the request: Sanford Wiell
(Citigroup), Philip Purcell (Morgan Stanley), Richard Fuld (Lehman Brothers), Henry Paulson Jr.
(Goldman), Allen Wheat (former CEO of CSFB), and David Komansky (former CEO of Merrill
Lynch). Id.
181. Id.
182. See Press Release on Global Settlement, supra note 9.
183. See Dinallo Affidavit, supra note 139, at 14.
The concept of Chinese Walls originated in the late 1960's when Merrill Lynch misused
material, nonpublic information that it obtained in its role of underwriter for McDonnell
Douglas Corp. debentures. Learning that the company would report significantly lower
earnings than Merrill Lynch had publicly predicted, Merrill Lynch personnel continued to
promote the stock's acquisition, while selectively disclosing the negative earnings infor-
mation to certain institutional investors, who were able to sell their holdings prior to the
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has since been used in a broader sense to refer to structural or procedural
barriers that are used to "prevent investment bankers from influencing"
the research of "existing or potential investment banking clients."'' 84 The
New NASD/NYSE Regulations aim to reinforce the Chinese Wall be-
tween research and investment banking by removing investment bank-
ing's influence over the contents of research reports and analysts' com-
pensation. The new regulations attempt to limit structural influences that
investment bankers may have over research analysts, including:
" Research analysts may not be subject to the supervision of, or
control by, their firms' investment banking department or its per-
sonnel. Additionally, investment banking personnel may not have
any influence or control over the compensation of research ana-
lysts.
85
" Investment banking personnel, and other non-research person-
nel, 186 may not review a pending research report (or even discuss
the report with the analyst), 87 subject to limited exceptions. 188 On
public announcement [and thereby avoid a considerable loss]. The SEC took the position
that the parties privy to material, adverse, and non-public corporate information known to
emanate from a corporate source had gained an unfair, competitive advantage. It initiated
administrative proceedings for violation of Rule lOb-5 [17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5] promul-
gated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Merrill Lynch settled the matter by
consenting to a sanction and by adopting a policy prohibiting communication of material,
nonpublic information attained by the investment banking department to other depart-
ments. This policy, which was sanctioned by the SEC, represents the original Chinese
Wall.
Christine M. Bae & Carlton R. Asher, Jr., Chinese Walls-Procedures and Remedies for Dealing
With Conflicts of interest and Other Abuses by Broker-Dealers in Connection With Conduct by Their
Securities Analysts, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 2002: TAKING CONTROL OF THE PROCESS 128-29
(PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B0-01 A6, 2002).
184. See Dinallo Affidavit, supra note 139, at 14.
185. NASD Rule 2711 (b)(l); NYSE Rule 472(b)(1). The provisions of NASD Rule 2711 (b)(l)
and NYSE Rule 472(b)(1) do not apply, however, to firms that over the previous three years, on
average per year, have participated in ten or fewer investment banking services transactions as
manager or co-manager and generated $5 million or less in gross investment banking services reve-
nues from those transactions. NASD Rule 2711 (k); NYSE Rule 472(m). However, firms qualifying
for this "Small Firm Exemption" must maintain records for three years of any communication that,
but for the Small Firm Exemption, would have been subject to NASD Rule 2711 (b)(I) or NYSE
Rule 472(b)(1). Id.
186. Non-research personnel refers to any employee of the firm who is not directly responsible
for investment research other than legal or compliance personnel. NASD Rule 2711 (b)(2); NYSE
Rule 472(b)(2).
187. NASD Rule 2711 (b)(2); NYSE Rule 472(b)(2). For a discussion of the definition of what
constitutes a research report for purposes of NASD and NYSE rules, see infra notes 271-72 and
accompanying text.
188. NASD Rule 2711 (b)(3); NYSE Rule 472(b)(3). Investment banking personnel may only
review a pending research report to verify the accuracy of information, or to review the report for
any potential conflict of interest, and only if the firm's legal or compliance department serves as the
intermediary. NASD Rule 271 l(b)(3)(A); NYSE Rule 472(b)(3)(i). This intermediary role may be
satisfied by passing all documents through the legal or compliance department or by copying them
on the documents. Id. If the "fact checking" is done orally, it must be documented and it must be
done either through the firm's legal or compliance department or in their presence. NASD Rule
271 l(b)(3)(B); NYSE Rule 472(b)(3)(ii). The provisions of NASD Rules 271 1(b)(2), (3) and NYSE
Rules 472(b)(2), (3) do not apply to firms that qualify for the Small Firm Exemption. NASD Rule
2711(k); NYSE Rule 472(m). However, firms that qualify for the Small Firm Exemption must
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a similar note, a research analyst may not, subject to specific
exceptions, provide a draft research report to the subject company
prior to publication. 
89
An analyst's compensation may not be tied to "specific" invest-
ment banking transactions. 90 More specifically, firms must estab-
lish committees (which must report to the firm's board of direc-
tors and may not include representatives from investment bank-
ing) to annually review and document research analyst compensa-
tion.' 9' The compensation review committee must consider the
following factors, if applicable, when reviewing an analyst's
compensation: (1) the analyst's individual performance (e.g.,
quality of research and productivity); (2) the correlation between
the research analyst's recommendations and stock price perform-
ance; and (3) the overall ratings of the analyst from clients, sales
force, independent rating agencies, and peers (but not from in-
vestment banking). 92 The compensation review committee may
not consider as a factor the analyst's individual contributions to
the investment banking business. 93 However, the new rules do
permit analysts' compensation to be influenced by the firm's
overall investment banking revenues, so long as that fact is dis-
closed in the research reports. 94
* Research analysts are prohibited from participating in efforts to
solicit investment banking business. 95 Accordingly, analysts are
maintain records for three years of any communication that, but for the Small Firm Exemption,
would have been subject to NASD Rules 2711 (b)(2), (3) or NYSE Rules 472(b)(2), (3). Id.
189. NASD Rules 271 l(c)(l), (2); NYSE Rule 472(b)(4). A draft research report may only be
provided to the subject company to verify the accuracy of information in the report and only if: (I) a
complete draft of the report is submitted to the firm's legal or compliance department prior to send-
ing it to the subject company; (2) the draft report actually sent to the subject company excludes the
research summary, the research rating, and the price target; (3) after submission of the draft report to
the subject company, the analyst is subject to additional procedures should she wish to change her
proposed rating or price target; and (4) the firm may not inform a subject company of a proposed
rating change until after the close of trading in the principal market of the subject company one
business day prior to the announcement of the change. NASD Rules 271 I(c)(2), (3); NYSE Rule
472(b)(4). It should be noted that the Small Firm Exemption does not apply to NASD Rule 2711 (c)
nor to NYSE Rule 472(b)(4). See NASD Rule 2711 (k); NYSE Rule 472(m).
190. NASD Rule 271 l(d)(l); NYSE Rule 472(h)(1).
191. NASD Rule 271 l(d)(2); NYSE Rule 472(h)(2). While the New NASD/NYSE Regulations
prohibit investment banking personnel from influencing analyst compensation decisions and require
compensation review committees to review and approve analyst compensation, the new regulations
do not indicate who is responsible in the firm for determining analyst compensation. See infra note
200 and accompanying text; see also SEC Release No. 34-48252, supra note 9.
192. NASD Rule 2711 (d)(2); NYSE Rule 472(h)(2).
193. Id.
194. NASD Rule 2711 (h)(2)(A)(i)(a); NYSE Rules 472(h)(1), (k)(l)(ii)(a)(2).
195. NASD Rule 2711 (c)(4); NYSE Rule 472(b)(5). The prohibition does not apply to com-
munications between the research analyst and the subject company that are solely for the purpose of
due diligence. Id.
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prohibited from, among other things, participating in "pitches" for
prospective investment banking assignments. 196
In addition to the New NASD/NYSE Analysts Regulations, the
global settlement requires each of the ten investment banks to institute a
number of additional structural reforms that are meant to strengthen the
Chinese Wall. 19 7 While many of the reforms required by the global set-
tlement have been superceded by the New NASD/NYSE Analyst Regu-
lations, there are still a number of additional reforms. Highlights of these
additional reforms include:
" Analysts are prohibited from participating in "roadshows" or
other marketing or selling efforts in connection with investment
banking transactions. 198
" Each firm will create an oversight committee made up of research
management (and may include others, but not personnel from in-
vestment banking) to monitor, among other things, the overall
quality and accuracy of the firm's research. 199
" Compensation of analysts will be determined solely by the man-
agement of the research group and the firm's senior manage-
ment.200 The firms also agreed to a number of principles that will
guide analyst compensation, including: (1) analyst compensation
may not be based directly or indirectly on investment banking
revenues or results (provided that compensation may "relate to
the revenues or results of the firm as a whole") or on input from
investment banking personnel; (2) a significant portion of an ana-
lyst's compensation must be based on the quality and accuracy of
the analyst's research; and (3) analyst compensation criteria must
be set forth in writing, and management will document each com-
pensation decision for analysts subject to Regulation AC and for
research management. 2°  Finally, investment bankers cannot
evaluate analysts. °2
196. Id.
197. Final Judgments, supra note 168.
198. Addendum A to the Final Judgments, at §§ 1. 1 La, b [hereinafter Addendum A]; see Final
Judgments, supra note 168. The "road show" is the issuer's marketing trip to investors in a securities
offering, and is typically organized by the issuer's underwriters. See supra note 79 and accompany-
ing text. Notably, within days after the announcement of the global settlement, Bear Steams was
soundly criticized for allowing one of its research analysts to promote the stock of an IPO candidate,
iPayment, during a roadshow. See Ann Davis, Bear Steams Used Analysts to Tout IPO Despite Pact
With Regulators, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2003, at AI. Although the global settlement technically had
not yet taken effect, Bear Steams reacted by delaying the iPayment IPO and barring the analyst from
covering iPayment. Id.
199. Addendum A, supra note 198, at § 1. 12.
200. Id. at 1.5. Unlike the New NASD/NYSE Analyst Regulations, the global settlement speci-
fies who is to determine the compensation for analysts. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at § 1.6.
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* Research must have its own dedicated legal and compliance staff,
although such legal and compliance personnel may be a part of
the firm's overall compliance/legal infrastructure.2 °3
* Research's budget (and the allocation of research expenses) shall
be determined "without input from Investment Banking and with-
out regard to specific revenues or results derived from Investment
Banking, though revenues and results of the firm as a whole may
be considered ....,,20
* Investment bankers will have no input into company-specific
coverage decisions, including whether or not to initiate or termi-
nate coverage for a specific company.20 5 With certain exceptions,
potential investment banking revenues may not be taken into ac-
count when making company-specific coverage decisions.20 6
b. Prevent promises of favorable research coverage
As a further measure to separate research from investment bank-
ing's influence, the New NASD/NYSE Analyst Regulations attempt to
prevent the practice of trading research for investment banking fees.
* A firm may not offer favorable research, a specific rating or a
specific price target to a company, or threaten to change research,
a rating or a price target, as consideration or inducement for the
207
receipt of business or compensation.
" A firm may not (nor may any employee involved with its invest-
ment banking activities) retaliate against or threaten to retaliate
against any research analyst for an adverse, negative, or otherwise
unfavorable research report or public appearance written or made
by the research analyst that may adversely affect the firm's pre-
sent or prospective investment banking relationship with the
company that is the subject of the research.20 8
* The new regulations impose "quiet periods" during which, subject
to certain limited exceptions, 2°9 firms may not issue research re-
ports on a company, and research analysts may not recommend or
offer an opinion on the company's securities. If the firm acted as
203. Id. at § 1.2.
204. Id. at § 1.3.
205. Id. at § 1.7.
206. Id.
207. NASD Rule 2711 (e); NYSE Rule 472(g)(1).
208. NASD Rule 2711(j); NYSE Rule 472(g)(2 ).
209. Subject to federal securities laws and regulations, firms may permit the issuance of re-
search reports and the provision of recommendations and opinions by a research analyst if such
actions are due to significant news or events, provided that such research reports are pre-approved in
writing by the firm's legal or compliance personnel. NASD Rule 2711 (f)(l)(B)(i); NYSE Rule
472(0(5).
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manager or co-manager on an IPO for the company, the quiet pe-
riod will extend for forty calendar days following the date of the
offering. °10 Also, if the firm acted as manager or co-manager on a
secondary offering for the company, the quiet period will extend
for ten calendar days following the date of the offering of an inac-
tively traded security. 21' If the firm acts as an underwriter (other
than as manager or co-manager) or dealer on an IPO, the quiet pe-
riod for that firm will be twenty-five calendar days after the date
of the offering.212
2. Restrict Personal Trading of Analysts in the Companies They
Cover
In order to address conflicts of interest between an analyst and her
personal trading, the New NASD/NYSE Analyst Regulations provide a
number of restrictions on personal trading by analysts and their "house-
hold members. '21 3 Subject to certain limited exceptions,214 no research
analyst (or household member) may:
" Purchase or receive an issuer's securities prior to its initial public
offering (i.e., no pre-IPO shares) if the issuer is principally en-
gaged in the same types of business as companies covered by the
analyst.
2 1 5
" Trade in the securities (or derivatives of such securities) of a
company she covers for thirty calendar days prior to and five cal-
endar after she issues a research report on the company or
changes a rating or price target for the company.
216
210. NASD Rule 2711 (f)(l)(A); NYSE Rule 472(f)(1). The "date of the offering" is defined
under the New NASDJNYSE Analyst Regulations as the later of the effective date of the registration
statement or the first date on which the security was bona fide offered to the public. NASD Rule
2711 (f)(3); NYSE Rule 472.120.
211. NASD Rule 271 l(f)(l)(B); NYSE Rule 472(0(2). An "inactively traded" security is one
that does not qualify as actively traded under Rule 101(c)(l) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
See 17 C.F.R. § 242.101(c)(1) (2003). Rule 101 of the Securities Exchange Act is commonly re-
ferred to as being part of Regulation M. See id.
212. NASD Rule 2711(f)(2); NYSE Rule 472(f)(3).
213. A "household member" is defined as any individual whose principal residence is the same
as the research analyst's principal residence. NASD Rule 271 l(a)(3); NYSE Rule 472.40.
214. Exceptions include transactions that are pre-approved in writing by the firm's legal or
compliance department due to unanticipated significant changes in the research analyst's (or house-
hold member's) personal financial circumstances and transactions in accounts not controlled by the
research analyst (or household member). NASD Rules 271 l(g)(4), (5); NYSE Rule 472(e)(4). How-
ever, each exception granted must be in compliance with policies and procedures adopted by the
firm that are reasonably designed to ensure that transactions effected pursuant to these exceptions do
not create a conflict of interest. NYSE Rule 472(e)(4); see also NASD Rule 271 l(g)(4)(B), which
requires the extra policies and procedures for only certain of the possible exceptions. Excepted
transactions are also subject to additional record keeping requirements. See NASD Rule
2711 (g)(4)(C); NYSE Rule 472(e)(6).
215. NASD Rule 2711 (g)(l); NYSE Rule 472(e)(I).
216. NASD Rule 2711 (g)(2); NYSE Rule 472(e)(2).
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* Effect a trade contrary to the research analyst's most current rec-
ommendation (e.g., if the research analyst has a "buy" rating on a
stock, she cannot sell the stock).21 7
In addition, research supervisory personnel (e.g. research directors),
supervisory analysts, 218 and others who have direct influence or control
in the preparation of research reports and the establishment or change in
ratings or price targets may not effect trades in securities of companies
that are the subject of such research reports, ratings, or price target
changes without the prior approval of the firm's legal or compliance per-
sonnel.21 9
On a related note, the New NASD/NYSE Analyst Regulations pro-
hibit the issuance of "booster shot" reports.2 2 ° Specifically, the manager
or co-manager of a securities offering may not issue a research report
(nor make a public appearance) regarding an inactively traded security
within fifteen days before or after the expiration, waiver, or termination
of a lock-up agreement. 22 This thirty-day blackout period is meant to
"mitigate and/or eliminate the incentive for" a sell-side analyst "to issue
positive research reports" to "boost" the price of the stock while large
and influential investors (or employees of the analyst's firm) may be
trying to exit their positions from the company.222
3. Require Analysts to Certify Their Research
Regulation AC requires that research analysts formally take respon-
sibility for the recommendations they make in research reports and in
public appearances. The hope is that this requirement "creates an incen-
tive for analysts to examine, even more carefully, the basis and founda-
tions for his or her recommendations in preparing research reports. 223
Specifically, Regulation AC requires, subject to certain excep-
tions,224 that broker-dealers include in their research reports:
e A clear and prominent statement by the research analyst attesting
that all of the views expressed in the report accurately reflect the
217. NASD Rule 2711 (g)(3); NYSE Rule 472(e)(3).
218. Supervisory analysts are responsible for approving research reports to ensure their com-
pliance with applicable laws and regulations. See NYSE Rule 472(a)(2).
219. NASD Rule 2711 (g)(6); NYSE Rule 472(e)(5).
220. NASD Rule 2711 (f)(4); NYSE Rule 472(f)(4).
221. Id. An "inactively traded" security is one that does not qualify as actively traded. 17
C.F.R. § 242.101(c)(1). Rule 101 of the Securities Exchange Act is commonly referred to as being
part of Regulation M. Id. For a description of a lock-up agreement see supra note 119.
222. NASD and NYSE Rulemaking, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47110, 68 Fed. Reg. 826
(Dec. 31, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-471 I 0.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
223. Regulation AC Press Release, supra note 9.
224. Regulation AC does not apply to: (I) broker-dealers that distribute research prepared by a
third party research analyst whose employer satisfies certain independence criteria; (2) foreign
persons located outside of the United States who prepare reports pertaining to a foreign security; and
(3) the news media. 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.501(b), 503, 505.
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research analyst's personal views about the company and its secu-
rities.225
A statement by the research analyst that discloses whether or not
she has received any compensation, directly or indirectly, related
to the specific recommendations or views in the research re-
226port. If the analyst has received compensation based on her
specific recommendations or personal views, additional detailed
227disclosure is required regarding the compensation.
Of particular note, the official release statement for Regulation AC
clarifies that the analyst's attestation applies to both her summary rating
(e.g., buy, hold, or sell) and to the detailed analysis that explains the ba-
sis for the rating.228 Because ratings are often delivered without the de-
tailed analysis, the SEC clarified that in situations where the analysis
significantly qualifies the rating, a communication by the firm or analyst
of just the rating could be misleading.229 Where the analysis actually con-
tradicts the stated rating, both the analyst and the firm could be in viola-
tion of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws, and the
analyst's certification could be deemed to be false and in violation of
Regulation AC.23°
With respect to public appearances, Regulation AC also requires
that broker-dealers, subject to certain exceptions, 231 collect and maintain
periodic certifications of research analysts that make public appear-
ances.2 32 The broker-dealer is required, within thirty days after any cal-
endar quarter in which one of its analysts made a public appearance, to
make a record that contains the following:
" A statement by the research analyst attesting that all of the views
expressed by the analyst in all public appearances during the cal-
endar quarter accurately reflected the research analyst's personal
views at that time.233
" A statement by the research analyst attesting that no part of the
analyst's compensation was, is, or will be, directly or indirectly
related to the specific recommendations or views expressed by the
research analyst in such public appearances.2 4
225. Id. § 242.50 1(a)(I).
226. Id. § 242.501 (a)(2).
227. Id. § 242.501 (a)(2)(ii).
228. Regulation AC Press Release, supra note 9.
229. Id.
230. id.
231. See supra note 224.
232. 17 C.F.R. § 242.502.
233. Id. § 242.502(a)(1).
234. Id. § 242.502(a)(2).
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4. Increase Disclosure Requirements
The New NASD/NYSE Analyst Regulations require both more de-
tailed and more frequent disclosure on a number of fronts from both the
analysts and their firms. For example:
" The new regulations clarify that mandatory disclosure obligations
apply not only to classic research reports, but also when analysts
make public appearances, 235 such as when they recommend stocks
on television programs (e.g., CNBC or Bloomberg TV), through
printed media articles, or at investor conferences.236
" The following disclosures must be made by firms in each research
report and by research analysts during each public appearance: (1)
if, as of the last day of the month before the publication of the re-
search report or the public appearance (or the end of the second
most recent month if the publication or appearance is less than ten
calendar days after the end of the most recent month), the firm or
its affiliates beneficially own one percent or more of any class of
common equity securities of the subject company; 237 (2) if the re-
search analyst (or a household member) has a financial interest in
the securities of the subject company, and the nature of the finan-
cial interest; 238 (3) if the subject company is a client of the firm,
or was a client during the twelve-month period preceding the date
of distribution of the report or date of the public appearance, and
the types of services provided to the subject company; 239 (4) if the
firm, or an affiliate of the firm, received any compensation from
the subject company in the past twelve months from either in-
vestment banking or non-investment banking services; 240 (5) if
235. The prior NASD and NYSE regulations were not historically applied to recommendations
made by research analysts through the media, such as recommendations made in television inter-
views or in the print media. SEC Release No. 34-45908, supra note 152. Television interviews of
analysts, in particular, became common place in the late 1990s. It was a common occurrence on
CNBC or CNN Finance for research analysts to provide "their best picks" with no disclosure given
regarding possible conflicts of interest the analyst might be facing.
236. See NASD Rule 2711 (a)(4); NYSE Rule 472.50.
237. NASD Rule 271 I(h)(l)(B); NYSE Rules 472(k)(l)(i)(c), (k)(2)(i)(a).
238. NASD Rule 271 l(h)(l)(A); NYSE Rules 472(k)(l)(iii)(b), (k)(2)(i)(b).
239. NASD Rules 2711(h)(2)(A)(iii)(b), (h)(2)(B)(iii); NYSE Rules 472(k)(l)(i)(d)(l),
(k)(I)(ii)(b)(l), (k)(2)(i)(c)(l). The services may be described as investment banking services, non-
investment banking-securities related services and non-securities services. NASD Rule
2711 (h)(2)(A)(iii)(b); NYSE Rules 472(k)( I )(i)(d)( I), (k)( I )(ii)(b)(I), (k)(2)(i)(c)( I). The disclosure
required for public appearances is subject to a knowledge qualifier by the research analyst. NASD
Rule 271 l(h)(2)(B)(iii); NYSE Rule 472(k)(2)(i)(c). Finally, firms and research analysts are not
required to disclose a client relationship if such disclosure would require material non-public infor-
mation regarding specific potential future investment banking transactions of the subject company.
NASD Rule 2711 (h)(2)(C); NYSE Rule 472(k)(3)(i).
240. NASD Rules 271 l(h)(2)(A)(ii)(b), (h)(2)(A)(iii)(a), (h)(2)(A)(iv)-(v), (h)(2)(B)(i); NYSE
Rules 472(k)(1 )(i)(a)(2), (k)(I)(i)(d)(2), (k)(I)(ii)(b)(2), (k)(l)(iii)(a), (k)(2)(i)(c)(2). The disclosure
to be made in public appearances is of a more limited nature than that required in research reports
and is subject to a knowledge qualifier by the research analyst. The disclosure to be made in research
reports is more detailed and, with respect to compensation received by an affiliate of the firm for
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:1
the research analyst received compensation for investment bank-
ing services from the subject company in the past twelve
months; 241 (6) if the research analyst (or a household member)
serves as an officer, director, or advisory board member of the
subject company; 242 and (7) any other actual, material conflicts of
interest of the research analyst or the firm which the research ana-
lyst knows of, or has reason to know of, at the time of the report
24or appearance. 3 Finally, firms are required to maintain records
of public appearances by research analysts to demonstrate com-
pliance with the regulations related thereto.2"
The new regulations also require a number of additional disclo-
sures in all research reports (although this disclosure is not re-
quired by research analysts during public appearances). Specifi-
cally, firms must disclose: (1) if the research analyst has received
compensation that is based on the firm's overall investment bank-
ing revenues; 245 (2) if the firm is making a market in the subject
company's securities at the time that the research report was pub-
lished;246 (3) the valuation methods used to determine a price tar-
get; 247 (4) the meanings of each of the ratings the firm uses in its
rating system; 248 (5) the percentage of securities assigned tobuy/hold/sell categories and the percentage of companies that fall
within each of these three categories for which the firm has pro-
vided investment banking services within the preceding twelve
months ;249 (6) a price chart that graphically illustrates the histori-
non-investment banking services, is also subject to a knowledge qualifier and includes safe harbors
for satisfying the requirement. NASD Rules 271 1(h)(2)(A)(v)(a), (b); NYSE Rules472(k)(I )(iii)(a)(I )-(3).
241. NASD Rules 2711(h)(2)(A)(i)(b), (h)(2)(B)(ii); NYSE Rules 472(k)(l)(ii)(a)(l),(k)(2)(i)(f).
242. NASD Rule 271 l(h)(3); NYSE Rules 472(k)(l)(iii)(c), (k)(2)(i)(e).
243. NASD Rule 271 l(h)(l)(C); NYSE Rules 472(k)(l)(iii)(d), (k)(2)(i)(d). Mandatory disclo-
sure of conflicts of interest by research analysts is not a new concept. See § 17(b) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (2000). Section 17(b) provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person ... to publish, give publicity to, or circulate any no-
tice, circular, advertisement, newspaper, article, letter, investment service, or communica-
tion which, though not purporting to offer a security for sale, describes such security for a
consideration received or to be received, directly or indirectly, from an issuer, under-
writer, or dealer, without fully disclosing the receipt, whether past or prospective, of such
consideration and the amount thereof.
Id.
244. NASD Rule 271 l(h)(12); NYSE Rule 472(k)(2) (Interpretation-Communications With
the Public).
245. NASD Rule 271 l(h)(2)(A)(i)(a); NYSE Rule (k)(l)(ii)(a)(2).
246. NASD Rule 2711 (h)(8); NYSE Rule 472(k)(1 )(i)(b).
247. NASD Rule 271 1(h)(7); NYSE Rule (k)(l)(i)(e). In addition, there must be a reasonable
basis for any price objectives, as well as a discussion of the risks that may prevent achievement of
the target. Id.
248. NASD Rule 2711 (h)(4); NYSE Rule 472(k)(l)(i)(f). As well, each definition must be
consistent with the plain meaning of the rating (e.g., "hold" must mean hold and not be a code word
for "sell"). Id.
249. NASD Rule 2711 (h)(5); NYSE Rule 472(k)( I )(i)(g).
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cal price trends of the covered stock with indications of the dates
on which the firm assigned or changed each rating or price target
and what the rating was in each case; 250 (7) if, in the past twelve
months, the firm managed or co-managed a public offering of se-
curities for the subject company; 25' and (8) more detailed infor-
mation relating to compensation received by the firm, or its affili-
ates, from the subject company in the past twelve months from ei-
ther investment banking or non-investment banking services and
if the firm expects to receive or intends to seek compensation for
investment banking services from the subject company in the next
three months 2
* Each of the above disclosures that are required in a research re-
port must be prominently presented on the front page of the re-
search report or the front page must refer to the page on which the
disclosures can be found.253
" The new regulations clarify that firms and research analysts,
whether in a research report or in a public appearance, must pro-
vide all other disclosures that are required by applicable law or
regulation, including the antifraud provisions of the federal secu-
rities laws.254
* Firms must publicly disclose their decisions to discontinue re-
search coverage of a company. 255 Specifically, the firm must
make available a final research report, subject to limited excep-
tions, on the subject company, and disseminate that report in the
same manner that it ordinarily uses when providing customers
256
with research reports on that company. Subject to limited ex-
ceptions, 257 the final report must be comparable in scope and de-
250. NASD Rule 271 l(h)(6); NYSE Rule 472(k)(l)(i)(h). The price chart requirement applies
only to:
securities that have been assigned a rating for at least one (I) year, and need not extend
more than three (3) years prior to the date of the research report. The information in the
price chart must be current as of the end of the most recent calendar quarter (or the sec-
ond most recent calendar quarter if the publication date is less than fifteen (15) calendar
days after the most recent calendar quarter).
NYSE Rule 472(k)(i)(h); see also NASD Rule 2711 (h)(6).
251. NASD Rule 2711 (h)(2)(A)(ii)(a); NYSE Rule 472(k)( 1 )(i)(a)( I).
252. See discussion supra note 240 and accompanying text; see also NASD Rules 271 l(h)(2)
(A)(ii)(b)-(c), (h)(2)(A)(iii)(a), (h)(2)(A)(iv)-(v); NYSE Rules 472(k)(I)(i)(a)(2)-(3), (k)(l)(i)(d)
(2), (k)(I)(ii)(b)(2), (k)(I)(iii)(a), (k)(2)(i)(c)(2). Finns are not required to disclose such investment
banking services if such disclosure would require material non-public information regarding specific
potential future investment banking transactions of the subject company. NASD Rule 2711 (h)(2)(C);
NYSE Rule 472(k)(3)(i).
253. NASD Rule 2711 (h)(10); NYSE Rule 472(k)(1).
254. NASD Rule 2711 (h)(9).
255. NASD Rule 2711 (f)(5); NYSE Rule 472(f)(6).
256. Id.
257. A firm shall not be required to produce a comparable report where it is impracticable for
the firm to do so (e.g., if the research analyst covering the company has left the firm or where the
firm has terminated coverage on an entire industry or sector). NASD Rule 2711 (f)(5); NYSE Rule
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tail to prior research reports, and must include a final recommen-
dation or rating.
The global settlement also requires the Ten Investment Banks to
render enhanced disclosures in research reports that are in addition to the
disclosures required by the New NASD/NYSE Analyst Regulations and
Regulation AC.258 These enhanced disclosures relate primarily to poten-
tial conflicts of interest that could impact the research and are meant to
serve as a "buyer beware" label.259 Specifically, the firms are required to
include the following disclosures on the first page of each research re-
port: (1) a statement that the firm "does and seeks to do business with
companies covered in its research reports," and "[a]s a result, investors
should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could
affect the objectivity of [the] report;" (2) an advisory that customers can
"receive independent, third-party research on the company covered in
[the] report, at no cost to them, where such research is available;" and (3)
a caution that "[i]nvestors should consider [the] report as only a single
factor in making their investment decision. ' 26
To enable investors to evaluate and compare the performance of
specific analysts, each of the Ten Investment Banks is also required to
publish on its website "a chart showing its analysts' performance, includ-
ing each analyst's name, ratings, price targets, and earnings per share
forecasts for each covered company, as well as an explanation of the
firm's rating system.",
261
5. Require Certain Firms to Provide Independent Research
"To ensure that individual investors get access to objective invest-
ment advice, 262 each of the Ten Investment Banks is obligated to furnish
independent research to its clients for a five-year period. Specifically,
each of the Ten Investment Banks will be required to contract with no
fewer than three independent providers of research and make available to
its customers this independent research.263 The firms must notify custom-
ers on their account statements, on the first page of research reports, on
the firm's website, and in connection with solicited orders that the inde-
pendent research is available at no cost to the customer.264 An independ-ent consultant shall be appointed for each firm.265 This independent con-
472(f)(6). However, the firm will still be required to provide a final recommendation or rating and
the rationale for the decision to terminate coverage. Id.
258. Addendum A, supra note 198, at § H. 1.
259. See id.
260. Id. at §§ I. l.a-c.
261. SEC Fact Sheet, supra note 173; Addendum A, supra note 198, at § H.2.
262. Press Release on Global Settlement, supra note 9.
263. Addendum A, supra note 198, at § 1II. I. There is, however, no requirement that there be
at least three independent research providers for the common stock of each company that is covered
by the firm's research department. Id.
264. Id. at §§ 111. .c, 111. Ig, 111.4.
265. Id. at § 111.2.
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sultant (who must be approved by the SEC, the NYSE, the NASD, the
President of the NASAA, the New York Attorney General, and the indi-
vidual firm) shall be responsible for procuring the independent research
providers, and will report annually to regulators on the independent re-
search .266
6. Additional Measures
In addition to the five fundamental changes, the Regulatory Actions
also seek to implement a few additional measures, including:
" The New NASD/NYSE Analyst Regulations now require that re-
search analysts be registered with the NASD and the NYSE and
267
must pass a qualification examination. Research analysts are
268
also subject to a continuing education requirement.
" A senior officer of the firm must attest annually that the firm has
adopted and implemented procedures to ensure compliance with
the New NASD/NYSE Analyst Regulations.26 9
* The New NASD/NYSE Analyst Regulations define the term "re-
search report" as "a written or electronic communication that in-
cludes an analysis of equity securities of individual companies or
industries, and that provides information reasonably sufficient
upon which to base an investment decision., 270 Notably, the defi-
nition of research report does not require that the communication
171include a recommendation.
* Under the global settlement, each of the Ten Investment Banks
must retain, at their own expense, an "Independent Monitor" ac-
ceptable to the SEC, the NYSE, the NASD, the NASAA, and the
New York Attorney General's Office, for the purpose of ensuring
that the reforms called for in the global settlement are "executed
and implemented in a meaningful way .... Within eighteen
months after the date of the entry of the Final Judgment, the Inde-
pendent Monitor shall conduct a review of the firm's compliance
with the undertakings required by the global settlement and will
266. Id. at §§ 1I.2, 111.3, II1.5.
267. NASD Rule 1050; NYSE Rule 344. For purposes of these rules, the term "research ana-
lyst" refers to analysts who are primarily responsible for the preparation of the substance of a re-
search report and/or whose name appears on the report. NASD Rule 1050; NYSE Rule 344.10.
268. NASD Rule 1120; NYSE Rule 345A.
269. NASD Rule 2711 (i); NYSE Rule 351(0. The attestation must include a certification that
research analyst compensation was reviewed and approved by a committee as required by NASD
Rule 2711 (d)(2) and NYSE Rule 472(h)(2), respectively. NASD Rule 2711 (i); NYSE Rule 351 (f).
270. NASD Rule 2711 (a)(8); see also NYSE Rule 472.10(2).
271. See NASD Rule 2711 (a)(8); see also NYSE Rule 472.10(2).
272. Donaldson Testimony, supra note 9; see also Addendum A, supra note 198, at § 1I.6.
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submit a written report of his or her findings to the SEC, NASD,
and NYSE.27 3
Finally, seven of the Ten Investment Banks will collectively pay
$80 million to finance an investor education fund.2 74 The investor
education fund shall be used, in part, "to support programs de-
signed to equip investors with the knowledge and skills necessary
to make informed investment decisions., 275 "The fund will make
grants to organizations to develop wide-ranging, neutral, and un-
biased investor education programs nationwide. 276 The fund will
be divided as follows: $52.5 million of the fund shall be adminis-
tered on a federal level by the SEC, NYSE and NASD, and the
remaining $27.5 million shall be provided to state securities regu-
lators for investor education purposes.277
IV. THE CASE FOR INVESTOR SKEPTICISM
The foundation for the Regulatory Actions is the hypothesis that
sell-side research analysts provided investors with poor investment guid-
ance due to the severe conflicts of interest that they faced. Specifically,
sell-side analysts were poor predictors of company and stock perform-
ance because they lacked independence, in particular from the interests
of investment banking. The primary focus of the Regulatory Actions has
been to render sell-side research more independent so as to promote the
integrity of, and restore confidence in, sell-side research analysts.278
A. Predictive Abilities of Sell-Side Analysts-Uncertainty Reigns
The regulators got ahead of themselves with the Regulatory Ac-
tions. Prior to attempting to restore confidence in sell-side research, one
must first ask the fundamental question: Is sell-side research valuable?
The answer to this question turns out to be both "yes" and "maybe not."
Yes, sell-side analysts provide valuable information that assists the mar-
ket to efficiently determine the appropriate price for a given stock.
Maybe not, in that sell-side analysts have historically had difficulties
with both forecasting the future performance of companies and making
stock recommendations.
There is really no dispute that sell-side analysts serve a valuable
function to investors in terms of information gathering and pure analysis.
273. Addendum A, supra note 198, at § l.6.a.
274. The seven firms are Bear Steams, Goldman, J.P. Morgan, Lehman, Merrill Lynch, SSB,
and UBS. Final Judgments, supra note 168. The investor education payments shall be made in five
equal installments on an annual basis. Id.; see also SEC Fact Sheet, supra note 173.
275. SEC Fact Sheet, supra note 173.
276. William H. Donaldson, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, Speech Pre-
pared for Delivery at SEC Press Conference Regarding Global Settlement (Apr. 28, 2003), at http://
www.sec.gov/news/speechlspch042803whd.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
277. SEC Fact Sheet, supra note 173.
278. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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Sell-side analysts perform the primary information gathering function for
a substantial number of the publicly-traded stocks in the United States.
These analysts gather information (both publicly available and not pub-
licly available) about the company, its industry, and its competitors, and
this information serves as the foundation for many of the investment
decisions that will be made regarding the specific stock. The Securities
Industry Association describes this information as "the lifeblood of the
markets and of those who participate in them., 279 In addition to informa-
tion gathering, sell-side analysts also perform the function of analyzing
the information to help investors better understand the dynamics that will
drive a company's future performance. Both the SEC and the U.S. Su-
preme Court have stated that the "value to the entire market of [analysts']
efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is significantly
enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze information, and
thus the analyst's work redounds to the benefit of all investors."28 °
The most difficult task of the sell-side analysts is to take that infor-
mation and analysis, and put it into action by means of investment ad-
vice. It is one thing to serve as an investigator and describe the current
situation. It is entirely another thing to predict how the situation will de-
velop over time. In giving investment advice, however, sell-side analysts
are being asked to predict the future, which is a very difficult task. The
two quantifiable predictions that sell-side analysts make routinely in their
research are earnings forecasts and stock recommendations (e.g., buy,
hold or sell).
Are analysts very good at forecasting the future earnings of the
companies they cover? The expected future earnings of a company are
arguably the single most important factor affecting that company's stock
281price. While there are many methods that may be employed to value a
given stock, the most traditional method employed is to examine the
company's future earnings potential. Future earnings potential is so im-
portant because it provides guidance as to the company's ability to pay
dividends, buy back stock, and/or accumulate a residual that can be dis-
tributed to shareholders upon liquidation.282
Academic studies have shown, however, that, as a class, sell-side
analysts are not accurate forecasters of company earnings.283 Rather, sell-
279. Fernandez, supra note 28, at 5.
280. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 n.17 (1983) (quoting Revision of Investment Company
Current Report Forms, Release No. 6283, Exchange Act Release No. 17479, 21 SEC Docket 1401,
1406 (Jan. 22, 1981 )).
281. MALKIEL, supra note 126, at 173.
282. See id.
283. See Vijay Kumar Chopra, Why So Much Error in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts?, FIN.
ANALYSTS J., Nov./Dec. 1998, at 35; see also David Dreman & Michael A. Berry, Analyst Forecast-
ing Errors and Their Implications for Security Analysis, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May/June 1995, at 30;
DAVID DREMAN, CONTRARIAN INVESTMENT STRATEGIES: THE NEXT GENERATION 91 (1998) (up-
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side analysts have demonstrated a consistent tendency for being signifi-
cantly overoptimistic with their earnings forecasts.2 4 In particular, these
studies have shown that sell-side analysts have a tendency to substan-
tially over-estimate current-year earnings at the beginning of the year,
and then adjust them downwards towards actual earnings throughout the
year.285 Analysts also have a tendency to be overoptimistic when project-
ing earnings growth rates.
286
Forecasting a company's future earnings is only one measure of an
analyst's worth. For many, the advice they are seeking from an analyst is
not an earnings number, but rather advice on whether the stock is a good
investment or not. For such persons, the question is whether the analyst
will provide them with sound stock picking advice. Academic theory
suggests that investors should not be able to craft profitable trading
strategies based on analyst recommendations as a result of the efficient
market theory. Under the semi-strong form of the efficient market theory
(which is the most widely accepted form by academics), it is believed
that stock prices reflect all of the publicly available information at the
time.287 Since analyst recommendations are publicly available,288 such
dating and reporting Dreman & Berry, supra, at 30) [hereinafter DREMAN, CONTRARIAN
INVESTMENT STRATEGIES].
284. See Chopra, supra note 283, at 36-37; DREMAN, CONTRARIAN INVESTMENT STRATEGIES,
supra note 283, at 91.
285. The Chopra Study reviewed current-year earnings forecasts for the S&P 500 from January
1985 through December 1997, and compared them to the actual earnings. Chopra, supra note 283, at
36. The Chopra Study found that sell-side analysts "overestimated current-year earnings by 6. I
percent in the 1985-97 period." Id. Analysts would typically start the year with extremely high
estimates (on average earnings were over-estimated by 11.2 percent at the beginning of the fiscal
year), and then adjust them downwards towards actual earnings throughout the year. Id. Finally, the
Chopra Study found that the quality of analysts' earnings forecasts appear to have improved in the
1993 to 1997 period (the over-estimation was greatly reduced) compared to the 1985 to 1992 period.
Id. at 35-37. The Dreman & Berry study reviewed 94,251 consensus analyst earnings forecasts that
took place between 1971 and 1996, involving more than 1,500 NYSE, Nasdaq, and AMEX compa-
nies. See DREMAN, CONTRARIAN INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 283, at 91. Specifically, the
study compared the consensus analyst earnings forecasts to the actual, reported earnings. Id. The
study included approximately 500,000 individual analyst estimates. id. The Dreman & Berry study
found that "analysts' estimates were sharply and consistently off the mark .... Id. The Dreman &
Berry study found that the average analyst error for the sampling (as a percent of reported earnings)
was forty-four percent annually. Id. Finally, the study found that when analysts projections were
wrong, they were four times more likely to be wrong on the high side (i.e., they were overly optimis-
tic), than on the low side. Id. at 97-98. In contradiction to Chopra's findings, the Dreman & Berry
study found that analysts' forecasts are getting worse. Id. at 91-92. Analysts' forecasts were off by
fifty percent (as a percent of reported earnings) from 1988 to 1996, compared to forty-five percent
from 1981 to 1988, and thirty percent from 1974 to 1980. Id.
286. See, e.g., Chopra, supra note 283, at 38 (finding the average consensus twelve-month EPS
(earnings per share) growth forecast was "double the actual growth rate in [actual] earnings"); see
also David Dreman, Don't Count on Those Earnings Forecasts, FORBES, Jan. 26, 1998, at I10
(discussing a study conducted by Dreman & Erik Lufkin); DREMAN, CONTRARIAN INVESTMENT
STRATEGIES, supra note 283, at 98 (also referencing the Dreman & Lufkin study). The Dreman &
Lufkin study examined analysts' estimates of earnings growth for companies in the S&P 500 be-
tween 1982 and 1997. Id. The actual growth annually was 7.8 percent, while the average projected
growth by analysts at the beginning of each year was 21.9 percent. Id.
287. The other forms of the efficient market theory are: (1) Strong Form: which provides that
the current stock price reflects all relevant information about the stock, even if not publicly avail-
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information should immediately be encapsulated into the price of the
relevant stock, and therefore, no abnormal investing advantage should be
consistently garnered by following analysts' investment advice. Rather,
investment returns should mirror the returns of the market as a whole
(e.g., if the market increases by ten percent, a broadly-based portfolio of
stock based on analysts' recommendations would be expected to increase
by approximately the same amount). 289 Beginning with a landmark study
conducted in 1933 by Alfred Cowles,290 a number of academic studies
were conducted that supported this theory and found that most sell-side
analysts do not generate returns that beat the market.
291
Most brokerage firms reject such a pure form of this theory, and
have invested incredible resources in research departments with the pur-
pose of generating returns for their clients that are superior to the returns
of the market as a whole.29 2 The measuring stick is beating the market
(rather than just generating a positive return), because investing in indi-
vidual stocks involves substantially greater risk than investing in a
broadly diversified basket of stocks. The market as a whole is the broad-
est possible basket, and can be invested in by purchasing broad-market
index funds (which simulate the performance of the market as a whole or
certain segments of the market). In order to compensate investors for
absorbing the additional risk of investing in individual shares, the inves-
tor should expect excess stock returns from following the sell-side ana-
lysts' recommendations.
More recently, a few studies have been conducted that have been
more complimentary towards the investment value of sell-side analyst
able; and (2) Weak Form: which provides that the current stock price reflects all past market prices
and data (in effect, technical analysis is of no use).
288. See, e.g., Boni & Womack, supra note 18, at 100. The authors explain that:
Many analysts' earnings forecasts and recommendations are now readily available to the
general public. For example, the Nasdaq web site (www.nasdaq.com) currently provides
the analyst recommendations (including upgrades, downgrades, and coverage initiation)
from 90 firms for stocks listed on Nasdaq and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
updated three times a day. It also provides the consensus of analysts' recommendations
and earnings forecasts as well as lists of stocks with the largest percentage change in ana-
lyst consensus of earnings forecasts and with the highest number of analysts' earnings
revisions for the week.
Id.
289. On a similar note, the Random Walk Theory espouses that "short-run changes in stock
prices cannot be predicted. Investment advisory services, earnings predictions, and complicated chart
patterns are useless." MALKIEL, supra note 126, at 24. The Random Walk Theory is based on the
notion that markets are moved by news, and news is random and unpredictable by definition. See id.
Once the news is known, it is quickly digested by the market and incorporated in the stocks price. Id.
at 197. As a result, a stock's price moves in a random and unpredictable manner. Id.
290. Alfred Cowles 3rd, Can Stock Market Forecasters Forecast?, I ECONOMETRICA 309
(1933).
291. See Clinton M. Bidwell, II, How Good Is Institutional Brokerage Research?, J.
PORTFOLIO MGMT., Winter 1977, at 26; R.E. Diefenbach, How Good Is Institutional Brokerage
Research?, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Jan./Feb. 1972, at 53; Dennis E. Logue & Donald L. Tuttle, Broker-
age House Investment Advice, 8 FIN. REV. 38 (1973).
292. Brad Barber et al., Can Investors Profit from the Prophets? Security Analyst Recommen-
dations and Stock Returns, 56 J. FIN. 531 (2001) [hereinafter Barber et al., Prophets].
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recommendations, although with some important caveats. In 1996, Pro-
fessor Kent Womack conducted a study on the investment value of sell-
side analysts' recommendations based on an analysis of a large sample of
analyst recommendations from major investment banks in the early
1990s. 293 The Womack study found that initiation of coverage by sell-
side analysts and changes in their recommendations have "a substantial
impact on stock prices immediately and in subsequent months., 294 Spe-
cifically, the study found an immediate price reaction to initiation of or
changes in recommendations, 295 but that reaction was not complete (i.e.,
it was an under reaction) and was followed by a "drift in the direction
recommended by the analysts for one to several months ... creating po-
tentially profitable trading strategies. 296 The study found that prices "re-
act to both buy and sell recommendations in the direction predicted, but
with sell recommendations, initial price changes are greater in magnitude
and prices drift (down) for longer., 297 Interestingly, however, the
Womack Study did not include the impact of transactions costs in its
analysis, which, as demonstrated below, could substantially impact such
potentially profitable trading strategies. In a similar study, Professor
Scott Stickel also found a correlation between sell-side analyst upgrades
298
and downgrades in stock price movement.
In 2001, a study conducted by Professors Brad Barber, Reuven Le-
havy, Maureen McNichols, and Brett Trueman analyzed "whether inves-
tors can profit from the publicly available recommendations of security
analysts." 299 The study examined whether investors can earn abnormal
returns (i.e., beat the market) by employing trading strategies based on
consensus analyst recommendations. 3°° The four researchers analyzed
stock recommendations for the period from 1985 through 1996, and con-
structed hypothetical stock portfolios based on owning stocks with the
most favorable consensus recommendations and shorting those with the
least favorable consensus recommendations. 30 The study found that fol-
293. Womack, supra note 65. Specifically, the Womack Study examined 1,573 recommenda-
tion changes, by fourteen of the top U.S. brokerage firms, on 822 different companies, during the
period from 1989-1991. Id. at 141-42.
294. Id. at 165.
295. The recommendation changes were grouped into four separate categories: (1) added to
buy list; (2) removed from buy list; (3) added to sell list; and (4) removed from sell list. Id. at 142.
296. Boni & Womack, supra note 18, at 101, which summarized the findings of the earlier
Womack Study.
297. Id.
298. Scott E. Stickel, The Anatomy of the Performance of Buy and Sell Recommendations, FIN.
ANALYSTS J., Sept./Oct. 1995, at 25.
299. Barber et al., Prophets, supra note 292, at 531.
300. Id. at 531-32. Consensus analyst recommendations are "the average of several analysts'
recommendations concerning the securities of a particular issuer." National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc., Understanding Securities Analyst Recommendations: Glossary of Analyst Research
Report Terms, at http://www.nasdr.conanalyst-glossary.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2003).
301. Barber et al., Prophets, supra note 292, at 540-42; see supra note 46 for the definition of
"shorting" a stock. Using data from Zacks Investment Research, the study analyzed over 360,000
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lowing such a strategy, "in conjunction with daily portfolio rebalancing
and a timely response to recommendation changes, yield[ed] annual ab-
normal gross returns greater than four percent., 30 2 Abnormal return refers
to a return that is in excess of that generated by the CRSP
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted market index,3°3 which is meant
to simulate the performance of the market as a whole. In essence, the
study found that following this strategy resulted in returns that signifi-
cantly beat the market. Because retail investors typically take some time
to react to information changes, the study also analyzed the returns if
portfolio rebalancing did not take place on a daily basis, or if the investor
was delayed in reacting to the changes in the consensus recommenda-
tions and found that such delays substantially reduced the portfolio re-
turns.3°4 Most notably, however, the study found that the proposed in-
vestment strategies would:
require a great deal of trading, and generate correspondingly high
transaction costs. After accounting for these costs, [the study found]
that none of [its] strategies generated an abnormal net return that is
reliably greater than zero. This strongly suggests that, although mar-
ket inefficiencies exist, they are not easily exploitable by traders,
thereby allowing these inefficiencies to persist.
305
In 2003, the four authors updated their prior study by analyzing sell-
side recommendations through 2001 .306 For the period from 1996
through 1999, the second study found market adjusted returns that were
similar to those found in the first study.30 7 Namely, on a gross basis, sell-
side analysts' top stock picks significantly outperformed the CRSP
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted market index, while the least fa-
vored stocks significantly underperformed such index. 30 8 This follow-up
study, however, did not examine the impact of transaction costs on such
a trading strategy. For the years 2000 and 2001, the second study found a
substantial divergence from the earlier results, with the stocks least fa-
vored by sell-side analysts substantially outperforming the market, and
the stocks most highly favored substantially underperforming the mar-
ket.309 As a result, investors would have been wise to do the opposite of
analyst recommendations, from 269 brokerage firms and 4,340 analysts over this period. Barber et
al., Prophets, supra note 292, at 533.
302. Barber et al., Prophets, supra note 292, at 531. This greater than four percent return was
"after controlling for market risk, size, book-to-market, and price momentum effects." Id. at 561.
303. CRSP is the Center for Research in Securities Prices, a financial research center at the
University of Chicago Graduate School of Business. Center for Research in Securities Prices, at
http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/research/crsp (last visited Nov. 12, 2003).
304. Barber et al., Prophets, supra note 292, at 551-53.
305. Id. at 562 (citation omitted).
306. Barber et al., Analysts' Recommendations, supra note 45.
307. Id. at 88-89.
308. Id. at 94.
309. Id. at 88. Specifically, the stocks least favored by sell-side analysts outperformed the
CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted market index by 13.44 percent, while the stocks most
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what analysts were recommending in 2000 and 2001. The study further
concluded that "these poor results were driven, at least in part, by ana-
lysts' tendency to recommend small-capitalization growth stocks during
those years, despite the fall of those stocks from favor.",3 10 The authors of
the study raise the question of whether the sell-side analysts' loyalty to
the small-cap growth stocks may have been motivated by a desire to at-
tract and retain potential investment banking clients.3 1
Researchers have also documented that sell-side analysts exhibit
persistence in their relative stock picking ability.31 2 Professors Michael
Mikhail, Beverly Walther, and Richard Willis conducted a study which
found that sell-side analysts "who performed well (poorly) relative to
their peers in the past continue to outperform (underperform) in the fu-
ture .... ,,3 The study also found that "the length of an analyst's track
record is important-analysts with a five-year winning streak outshine
the performance of those with shorter track records of superior perform-
ance." 314 Notably, however, Professors Mikhail, Walther, and Willis
were unable to develop a strategy for generating excess returns by fol-
lowing the recommendation revisions of higher ,erforming analysts once
transaction costs were figured into the equation.P,
5
While the above studies are informative, whether sell-side analyst
recommendations have consistent investment value remains an open
question. Once transaction costs are included in the equation, it simply is
unclear whether an investing strategy based on sell-side analyst recom-
mendations can be developed that consistently beats the market.
B. Regulatory Actions Do Not Address Fundamental Conflicts
Now that it is clear that sell-side analysts' greatest value may not lie
in their forecasts (which are generally overoptimistic) or their recom-
mendations (of which the investment value is unclear), can anything be
done to improve the analysts' predictive capabilities? The regulators
appear to think something can be done. The Regulatory Actions seek to
make five fundamental changes to sell-side research, ostensibly with the
goal of improving its results. Again, these five changes are: (1) clearly
separate sell-side research from investment banking; (2) restrict personal
trading of analysts in the companies they cover; (3) require analysts to
highly recommended by analysts underperformed by the CRSP NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-
weighted market index by 7.06 percent. Id. at 88-89.
310. Id. at 88.
311. Id.
312. See Michael B. Mikhail et al., Do Security Analysts Exhibit Persistent Differences in Stock
Picking Ability?, Social Science Electronic Library (Jan. 2002), at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3 (last
visited Feb. 13, 2004).
313. Id. at 19. The Mikhail, Walther, and Willis study examined "268,170 recommendation
revisions issued by 4,923 analysts for 7,845 firms during 1985-1999." Id. at 6.
314. Id. at 27.
315. See id. at 23-26.
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certify their research; (4) increase disclosure requirements for research;
and (5) require certain firms to provide independent research to their
clients. Because the separation of sell-side research from the influences
of investment banking is clearly the primary focus of the Regulatory
Actions, this Article will address it last and first clear away the "other
four" changes.
First, the restriction on the personal trading of analysts is really
nothing more than a reaction to one well-publicized, and easy to criticize,
practice. While the personal trading of analysts in contradiction to their
ratings has led to a number of well-documented and embarrassing inci-
dents for the research community, 316 it would be a far reach to argue that
this practice was a primary driver of analyst underperformance. As a
result, the restriction on the personal trading of analysts is not likely to
have a material impact on analyst performance. On a similar note, requir-
ing analysts to certify their research is also not core to the sell-side ana-
lyst issue, and is also not likely to result in any major change in analyst
performance. Putting one's name on a report is a heady experience, and it
is highly unlikely that certification will materially cause analysts "to ex-
amine, even more carefully, the basis and foundations for his or her rec-
ommendations in preparing research reports" as is hoped by Regulation
AC.3 17 The personal trading restrictions and Regulation AC are mere
window dressing, and are not likely to substantially impact analyst per-
formance either positively or negatively. The concern, however, is that
changes such as these will help to restore investor confidence in sell-side
analysts, which this Article will argue is a substantial negative conse-
quence. Part V of this Article will discuss the danger of restoring inves-
tor confidence and how to ensure that it does not occur.
Regarding the increased disclosure requirements called for by the
Regulatory Actions, they show some promise and will be discussed in
more detail below, in Part V, where the author argues for a more effec-
tive means of disclosure that should be the centerpiece of any new dis-
closure requirements. Finally, with respect to the provision of independ-
ent research by the Ten Investment Banks, it is solid evidence in favor of
this Article's argument that the Regulatory Actions do not in fact result
in a clear separation of research from investment banking. If they did,
there would be no need to require the Ten Investment Banks to provide
independent research to their clients.
Although Part II of this Article catalogued a number of potential
conflicts that plague sell-side research, the core conflict that faces sell-
316. A May 2001 New York Times article, for example, chronicled sales by a number of sell-
side analysts of stocks they covered while maintaining "buy" ratings on the stocks. Morgenson, Buy,
They Say, supra note 105.
317. See Regulation AC Press Release, supra note 9 and accompanying text. This conclusion is
based on the author's personal and professional experience with sell-side analysts.
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side research is the competing pressures put on analysts by their firm's
brokerage clients and investment banking clients. 318 As noted earlier,
brokerage clients want "accurate" research that will assist them to invest
profitably, while investment banking clients want "optimistic" research
that will boost their stock price.31 9 With investment banking revenues far
outstripping brokerage revenues in recent years for the most prominent
firms on Wall Street, 320 the fear is that their analysts, which are amongst
the most high profile, are swayed more by their investment banking au-
dience than their brokerage audience. The Regulatory Actions are meant
to ease this pressure on sell-side analysts from the investment banking
side of the business and allow them to focus on serving brokerage cli-
ents. While substantial verbiage is given by the regulators to "clearly
separate" research from investment banking, the separation required by
the Regulatory Actions is insubstantial in reality and will do little to alter
sell-side analysts' motivations in the brokerage client/investment bank-
ing client conflict.
The Regulatory Actions attempt to separate research from invest-
ment banking primarily by reinforcing the Chinese Wall that separates
these two departments and by implementing rules to prevent promises of
favorable research coverage. While noble in spirit, it is doubtful that ei-
ther of these objectives can be accomplished. Let us begin with reinforc-
ing the Chinese Wall. What is most important to understand about Chi-
nese Walls is that they are not perfect. A Chinese Wall is only as strong
as the individuals who are the subject of the segregation. If the individu-
als are honest and law-abiding, which describes the vast majority of indi-
viduals in Wall Street firms, then the Chinese Wall works nicely. How-
ever, because it is impossible to monitor and detect all infractions of a
Chinese Wall, it only takes a few individuals who view the Chinese Wall
as a "formality" or "technicality," and the wall begins to develop cracks
and breaches.32'
The biggest weakness in the "reinforced" Chinese Wall is the very
same weakness that is at the heart of the current furor: analyst compensa-
318. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
319. Boni & Womack, supra note 18, at 93.
320. In 1999, major firms generated $24.6 billion in investment banking fees compared to $9.5
billion in brokerage commissions. Sargent, supra note 96, at 72.
321. The author finds it curious that the regulators settled on Chinese Walls as the primary
mechanism for restoring confidence in equity, sell-side research. The reason that the regulators have
focused on the sell-side analyst problem was because a number of major investment banks and
research analysts violated existing rules, including: "[iun making a recommendation ... a member
must have a reasonable basis for the recommendation .... " NASD Rule 2120(d)(2)(B)(i). So the
solution to the problem is to establish a set of Chinese Walls that require a substantial amount of
trust to implement. We could not trust Wall Street to follow the prior rules, but now we are being
asked to trust that Wall Street will comply with the Chinese Walls. Interestingly, the Great Wall of
China (for which Chinese Walls are named) was originally built as a defensive fortification to repel
invaders from the north, but was eventually breached by both the Mongols and the Manchurians.
TravelChinaGuide.com, History of the Great Wall, at http://travelchinaguide.com/china-greatwall/
history/index.htm (last visited Nov. 1,2003).
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tion. If analyst compensation can be tied to the analysts' "cooperation"
with the investment banking department (even if only indirectly), the
other elements of the Chinese Wall (e.g., prohibiting investment bankers
from reviewing pending research reports or supervising research ana-
lysts) amount to a one-foot high wall over which it is quite easy to step.
How is analyst compensation affected by the Regulatory Actions?
Under the New NASD/NYSE Analyst Regulations, an analyst's compen-
sation may not be tied to "specific" investment banking transactions.
322
More specifically, firms must establish committees (which must report to
the firm's board of directors and may not include representatives from
investment banking) to annually review and document research analyst
compensation. The compensation review committee must consider the
following factors, if applicable, when reviewing such research analyst's
compensation: (1) the analyst's individual performance (e.g., quality of
research and productivity); (2) the correlation between the research ana-
lyst's recommendations and stock price performance; (3) the overall rat-
ings of the analyst from clients, sales force, independent rating agencies,
and peers.323 The compensation review committee may not consider, as a
factor, the analyst's contributions to the investment banking business.324
However, because part of the job responsibilities of a sell-side analyst
involve advising "investment banking departments concerning such mat-
ters as whether a potential underwriting client is financially or operation-
ally prepared for an initial public offering, 325 the new rules do permit
analysts to be compensated based upon (among other factors) the firm's
overall investment banking revenues so long as that fact is disclosed in
the research reports.326 Here is an example of such a disclosure that was
included in a recent Merrill Lynch research report: "The analyst(s)
responsible for covering the securities in this report receive
compensation based upon, among other factors, the overall profitability
of Merrill Lynch, including profits derived from investment banking
revenues." 327 Not surprisingly, this disclosure was included at the end of
the Merrill Lynch report and is one of a number of disclosures that are
labeled "important disclosures," but resemble instead boilerplate.328
For the Ten Investment Banks, they must also comply with the
global settlement, which requires that compensation of analysts be de-
termined solely by the management of the research group and the firm's
322. NASD Rule 271 l(d)(I); NYSE Rule 472(h)(I).
323. NASD Rule 2711 (d)(2); NYSE Rule 472(h)(2).
324. Id.
325. NASD and NYSE Rulemaking, Exchange Act Release No. 34-45526, 67 Fed. Reg.
11,526 (Mar. 8, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-45526.htm (last visited Nov. I,
2003).
326. NASD Rule 2711 (h)(2)(A)(i)(a); NYSE Rules 472(h)(1), (k)(I)(ii)(a)(2).
327. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., Cisco Systems Comment-Reading Through the Noise (Feb. 4,
2004) (on file with author).
328. See id.
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senior management. 329 The global settlement also requires that the Ten
Investment Banks comply with a number of principles that guide analyst
compensation, including: (1) analyst compensation may not be based
directly or indirectly on investment banking revenues or results (pro-
vided that compensation may "relate to the revenues or results of the firm
as a whole") or on input from investment banking personnel; (2) a sig-
nificant portion of an analyst's compensation must be based on the qual-
ity and accuracy of the analyst's research; and (3) analyst compensation
criteria must be set forth in writing, and management will document each
compensation decision for analysts subject to Regulation AC and for
research management. 330 Finally, investment bankers cannot evaluate
analysts.33'
So, what has changed under the Regulatory Actions regarding ana-
lyst compensation? Not very much. Firms must add additional layers of
bureaucracy (e.g., the analyst compensation review committees), and if a
firm wants to compensate an analyst for investment banking activities,
the firm must include the above sentence in the analyst's research re-
ports, and must not tie the compensation to any "specific" investment
banking deal or to the analyst's "specific" contributions to the investment
banking business. In addition, the firm must be careful to document the
rationale for each analyst's compensation, and to fit the compensation
decisions into the individual performance, stock performance, and over-
all ratings criteria. Notably, there is no required weighting between the
three broad categories. Finally, if the firm is one of the Ten Investment
Banks, it must also be careful to comply with the analyst compensation
principles that were agreed to in the global settlement. In total, there are
a few technical requirements and a number of compensation principles,
all of which can be satisfied while at the same time ignoring the spirit of
the Regulatory Actions.
Let us look at an example to illustrate this point. Assume that the
IPO market comes back strongly in a few years, and it is strongest for the
widget industry. Brokerage Firm X has the most well-known sell-side
analyst for the widget industry, Joe. The analyst is well known because
he appears regularly on CNBC and is very well-connected within the
industry. Joe's forecasting and stock-picking capabilities, however, tend
to be mediocre and it is felt within the firm that Joe may not conduct the
most thorough due diligence of the companies he covers. The perception
is that Joe finds "deals" much more interesting than conducting pure
analysis. Recently, a number of prominent companies in the widget in-
dustry have conducted IPOs, and in each case hired Brokerage Firm X as
an underwriter. The widget companies chose Investment Bank X primar-
329. Addendum A, supra note 198, at § 1.5.
330. Id.
331. Id. at § 1.6.
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ily because they wanted Joe and his fame associated with their compa-
nies. The underwriting fees from the deals were roughly $15 million to
Brokerage Firm X, and substantial additional investment banking fees
are expected over the next few years for further IPOs in the widget in-
dustry, as well as for financial advisory assignments and follow-on offer-
ings. Because of Joe's popularity with widget investment banking cli-
ents, a number of brokerage firms are trying to hire Joe away from Bro-
kerage Firm X.
How would we expect Brokerage Firm X to compensate Joe com-
pared to another of its analysts, Jane, who is an extremely accurate fore-
caster, but who covers an industry that is out of favor, and therefore,
generates almost no investment banking fees and mediocre brokerage
commissions? Presumably, regulators hope that Joe's compensation
would be inferior to, or at least in line with, Jane's compensation since
Jane's research analysis is superior (although it generates less revenue
for the firm). The management of Brokerage Firm X, however, might
view things differently. It is not hard to imagine that the management at
Brokerage Firm X desperately wants to keep Joe (and the accompanying
investment banking revenue), and chooses to compensate him hand-
somely. Because compensating an analyst for her contribution to invest-
ment banking is improper under the new rules, such a rationale could not
be stated. Joe's ability to generate substantial investment banking reve-
nue would become the pink elephant in the room that no one would men-
tion, but everyone would be aware was there. Of course Brokerage Firm
X's analyst compensation review committee would need to come up with
some rationale other than investment banking revenue for Joe's compen-
sation. For example, the committee might focus more on the "quality" of
Joe's research, which is a subjective criteria that should allow greater
latitude (e.g., the committee could focus on the originality of Joe's in-
vestment thesis), and on Joe's ratings with outside services (which are
particularly high with institutional investors because Joe is able to get
them superior access to company management), than on Joe's accuracy.
Moreover, the committee may even be able to credibly downplay Joe's
current history of inaccuracy as being due to a short-term market ineffi-
ciency-namely, Joe is correct in his analysis and predictions, and it is
just a matter of time before the market catches up to Joe's analysis. 332
Would Joe's superior compensation be proper? If the regulators
were able to demonstrate that Joe's compensation was based on his indi-
332. If Firm X were one of the Ten Investment Banks, it is possible that the Independent Moni-
tors (who are charged with ensuring that the Ten Investment Banks execute and implement the
reforms called for in the global settlement in a meaningful way, see supra notes 272-73 and accom-
panying text) could impede Joe's compensation. However, such an outcome would require the
Independent Monitor to see a problem with Joe's compensation and to have the actual authority to
stop the procedure (which is not yet clear). And, the Independent Monitors will only be reviewing
the Ten Investment Banks for a six-month window that will take place eighteen months after the
Final Judgment is entered, which dramatically reduces the scope of activity they will see.
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vidual contributions to investment banking, then the compensation would
be a clear violation of the Regulatory Actions. 333 Demonstrating Broker-
age Firm X's inappropriate intent in its compensation decision, however,
is not likely to be an easy task. It is not improper for firms to pay differ-
ent analysts differently, and since the factors that a firm must consider in
setting compensation are largely subjective (e.g., there is no requirement
that the most accurate forecasters must be the highest paid), it should
prove difficult to prove infractions of the new compensation rules absent
some sort of smoking gun. Since firms have been formally put on notice
of the requirements, direct evidence will likely be rare. Presumably, Wall
Street officials will be more careful with their e-mails in the future, and it
would be surprising if any of the documentation produced by the com-
pensation review committees were incriminating. If anything, the new
rules remind the firms to properly "paper" their decisions.
To compound matters, it has been argued that the regulators princi-
pally charged with enforcing the separation of research and investment
banking, the NASD and the NYSE, suffer from a serious conflict of in-
terest that may substantially impede their enthusiasm in enforcing the
rules.334 In a recent article, Professors Fisch and Sale argue that the
"NYSE and the NASD are run by, and primarily are accountable to, their
members, the brokerage firms. Given the importance of investment bank-
ing business for member firms, it is unrealistic to expect the [NASD and
the NYSE] actively to curtail a structure that promotes these opera-
tions. 335
At best, the new compensation rules are aspirational. Hopefully the
brokerage firms will take the spirit of the rules to heart and will truly
compensate analysts for good analysis, and not for investment banking
business. Wall Street's history is checkered with examples of scandals
and misbehavior.336 The Regulatory Actions are simply another reaction
333. Specifically, Joe's compensation would violate the new analyst compensation rules set
forth in NASD Rules 271 l(d)(l)-(2) and NYSE Rules 472(h)(l)-(2). As well, both the firm and Joe
would be in violation of the new NASD and NYSE disclosure requirements regarding compensation.
If Investment Bank X is one of the Ten Investment Banks, Joe's compensation would also violate
the global settlement. See Addendum A, supra note 198, at § 1.5.
334. Fisch & Sale, supra note 130, at 1096.
335. Id.
336. It was a little more than five years ago that thirty-seven major securities firms (including
each of the Ten Investment Banks) agreed to pay $1 billion (a record at the time) to settle charges of
alleged price-fixing in Nasdaq stocks. Times Wire Services, 30 Brokerages Agree to Pay $1 Billion
to Settle Class-Action Suit Litigation: Firms Deny Charges They Colluded to Fix Prices on Nasdaq.
Move Is Called the Largest Civil Antitrust Deal in History., L.A. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1997, at D1. Even
the recent regulatory attention is not limited solely to improper research analyst practices. The global
settlement, for example, also charged two of the firms (CSFB and SSB) with "spinning" hot IPO
allocations. Press Release on Global Settlement, supra note 9; see also supra note 171 for a detailed
discussion of spinning. Suffice it to say that spinning can be characterized as a form of corporate
bribery. Another current regulatory inquiry involves allegations that a number of firms "laddered"
IPOs during the late 1990s and 2000. Randall Smith, SEC 'Laddering' Inquiry Reaches Two Firms,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2002, at C1. Laddering refers to the practice of underwriters allocating stock in
hot IPOs, to certain investors, in exchange for promises from these investors to purchase additional
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to such misbehavior. Why should we believe that Wall Street, if given
the opportunity, and a low probability of prosecution, will not misbehave
again in the future? Moreover, if compensation can still be influenced by
investment banking revenue, nothing fundamental has changed regarding
the investment banking/research conflict. The sell-side analysts will re-
main aware of what the firm's investment banking interests are (which is
typically publicly available information), with the knowledge that: (1)
their research could help or hinder possible investment banking revenue
opportunities; and (2) their cooperation (or lack thereof) could materially
impact their compensation-regardless of the spirit of the new rules.
A similar weakness exists in the prohibition against promises of fa-
vorable research. Procedural changes are likely to occur, but not substan-
tive ones. For example, while investment bankers cannot make specific
promises to potential IPO clients of favorable research or a specific rat-
ing,337 there has been no indication that sell-side analysts will not con-
tinue the customary practice of issuing "buy" ratings on companies their
firms take public, even if the quiet period has been lengthened.338 Neither
should the new rules substantially curb the practice of issuers engaging
new underwriters for follow-on public offerings (e.g., further offerings of
their common stock following the IPO) in order to "buy additional and
influential [research] coverage from the new lead underwriter[s]. 339 In
each case, what is likely to occur will simply be a change in the proce-
dure: (1) pitch books will have disclaimers in bold stating that no prom-
ises regarding research are being made; (2) winks, nods, and body-
language will replace direct statements and promises by investment
bankers regarding future research coverage; and (3) research analysts
will be excluded from pitches.
While the Regulatory Actions' separation of research from the in-
fluences of investment banking is insubstantial, Wall Street will likely
avoid any truly egregious behavior for the next few years. For example,
shares, in the open-market, at higher prices. Id. The additional purchases at higher prices assist in
driving up the price of the stock (sometimes 200 or 300 percent in a single day), at which point the
investors can sell their shares and realize substantial profits-in particular from the shares received
in the IPO allocation. The underwriters were allegedly able to share in these profits by receiving
extremely high commissions for trades from these investors, which gives the appearance of
kickbacks. Kara Scannell, Deals & Dealmakers: Bid to Dismiss IPO-Market Suits Is Denied by
Judge, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2003, at C5. CSFB, Robertson Stephens, and J.P. Morgan have already
been charged by, and settled with, regulators as a result of laddering and accompanying IPO profit-
sharing violations. Randall Smith, Morgan Stanley May Face Charges In IPO Investigation, WALL
ST. J., July 14, 2003, at CI. It has been reported that the SEC is currently investigating four to five
other firms for such practice, including Morgan Stanley. Id.
337. NASD Rule 2711 (e); NYSE Rule 472(g)(1).
338. What the author does expect to see are boilerplate insertions in all IPO pitch books that
quote the specific language of NASD Rule 2711 (e) or NYSE Rule 4 7 2(g)(1). For example, the pitch
book may state that the firm may not "offer favorable research, a specific rating or a specific price
target, or threaten to change research, a rating or a price target, to a company as consideration or
inducement for the receipt of business or compensation."
339. See Laurie Krigman et al., Why Do Firms Switch Underwriters?, 60 J. FIN. ECON. 245,
245 (2001).
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it would not be surprising to see firms make a point to favor accurate
forecasters and recommenders in compensation decisions for the short
term. The regulatory spotlight remains very bright on Wall Street, and
firms and employees will likely be on their best behavior over the next
few years. However, with investment banking business currently down,
there is little impetus on the part of firms to push the edges of the new
rules, and it is easy for firms to behave. The test will not come until in-
vestment banking business returns, at which point the lessons of the last
few years may have already started to fade from everyone's memories.
One important characteristic about Wall Street is that it is primarily an
environment for the young, and it involves significant personnel turnover
on a yearly basis. As a result, the lessons of the past are often lost on the
Wall Street personnel of the present. As the late 1990s begin to fade from
memory, and investment banking makes a strong comeback, the prac-
tices of the past are likely to resurface.
With the amount of money in investment banking fees that are at
stake, the only way to truly eliminate investment banking's influence
over research is to completely sever research from brokerage firms that
conduct investment banking. If you want to separate research from in-
vestment banking's influence in a meaningful way, it would require a
Glass-Steagal134° type of separation, whereby brokerage firms that con-
duct investment banking activities may not be affiliated with research
activities. Anything less and the influences of investment banking will
still be very clearly felt by research. It is inevitable. But, and this is a big
"but," the ramifications of such a forced separation would be, substan-
tially worse than the status quo arrangement. As will be discussed in Part
IV.C of this Article, rendering sell-side research independent may not be
the panacea that regulators seem to think it is. 34 1 There are other funda-
mental factors that will continue to plague the predictive abilities of sell-
side analysts, and it is foolish to believe that making research independ-
ent will solve all of the problems.
While the benefit of a complete separation of research from invest-
ment banking may not be certain, the cost is certain, and it would be very
high. As noted earlier, sell-side research is not typically a self-supported
department within a brokerage firm.342 Sell-side research is given to cli-
340. The Bank Act of 1933, also known as the Glass-Steagall Act, was aimed at restoring
confidence in the U.S. banking system by forcing a separation between commercial banks (e.g.,
those that accept deposits) and brokerage firms. See The National Bank Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-
66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in various sections of 12 U.S.C.). The Glass-Steagall Act was
effectively repealed in 1999 by the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338
(1999) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832).
341. See also Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing
Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269 (2003). Professors Choi and Fisch ques-
tion whether independent analysts are truly independent and whether they are more accurate fore-
casters than analysts affiliated with investment banks. Id. at 284-85.
342. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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ents for free, with the goal of recovering the cost of the research through
brokerage commissions and investment banking fees. If investment
banking fees are removed from the equation, the basic business model
for providing sell-side research would have to be dramatically changed.
Sell-side research would be required to either find a new source of reve-
nue to support it, or decrease the cost of providing research. The most
likely new source of revenue would be to sell the research, rather than
give it away for free, but it is not clear whether there is a substantial
enough market for sell-side research that is not free. 343 If the demand is
not there, the outcome would be a substantial scaling-back of sell-side
research, both in number of analysts and analyst compensation, which is
likely to lead to a significant decrease in the quality of such research.
Since sell-side analysts provide the market with a substantial amount of
the information and pure analysis that goes into determining the stock
price for a significant portion of publicly-traded stocks, reducing the
quality of the research harms both companies and investors.3
C. Value of Rendering Sell-Side Research More Independent is Unclear
The above analysis assumes that rendering sell-side research more
independent will substantially improve the quality of such research. This
assumption seems logical, and is supported by a large amount of anecdo-
tal (and highly inflammatory) evidence that was obtained in the investi-
gation for the global settlement.345 While the global investigation demon-
strated that there were a number of bad actors amongst the thousands of
sell-side analysts on Wall Street, and while it is clear that research oper-
ates in the middle of a fundamental conflict of interest between a firm's
investment banking clients and its brokerage interests, 346 it remains nec-
343. See Boni & Womack, supra note 18, at 121; see also Choi & Fisch, supra note 341, at
286. Professors Choi and Fisch explain that sell-side research is difficult to sell for full value be-
cause it has the quality of a public good.
Once an analyst's research has been released to some investors, other nonpaying inves-
tors may learn of the research, either directly from the initial purchasers (who have every
incentive to disseminate the information once they have traded based on it), or indirectly
through changes in stock price. Subsequently, the analyst can no longer sell the informa-
tion.
Id. (citations omitted).
344. See Draho, supra note 70.
345. For example, some of the more oft-quoted e-mails that came out of the Merrill Lynch
investigation include the following from a Merrill Lynch Analyst:
if 2-2 [accumulate/accumulate rating] means that we are putting half of merrill retail into
this stock because they are accumulating it then i don't think that's the right thing to do.
we are losing people money and i don't like it. john and mary smith are losing their re-
tirement because we don't want todd [Tappin, GoTo CFO] to be mad at us.
the whole idea that we are independent from banking is a big lie-without banking this
would be a 3-2.
Dinallo Affidavit, supra note 139, at 26.
346. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
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essary to ask the following question: Does the influence of investment
banking result in a consistent and significant bias in sell-side research?
A number of academic studies have been conducted which shed
some light on the impact of investment banking on the performance of
sell-side analysts. While these studies cover periods prior to the late
1990s (when investment banking's pressure on research appears to have
been at its greatest), they still provide some useful information. One ex-
ample is a study published by Professors Roni Michaely and Kent
Womack in 1999, which examined "buy" recommendations on 391
IPOs, during 1990 and 1991.347 The study found that "buy" recommenda-
tions from sell-side analysts of the investment banks that underwrote the
IPO performed "more poorly than 'buy' recommendations by unaffili-
ated brokers prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the recommenda-
tion date. 34 8 Specifically, the study found that:
1. When the lead underwriter recommends "buy," the IPO stock in-
creases 2.7% on average at the time of the "buy" recommendation.
When analysts from non-lead banks recommend "buy," the increase
is 4.4%.
2. In the months before a "buy" recommendation, the stocks recom-
mended by lead underwriters had gone down 1.6% on average. In
contrast, stocks recommended by non-lead bank analysts had gone up
4.1%.
3. In the one-year period after the buy recommendations, the under-
writer recommended stocks underperformed the market by 5% on
average, while the stocks recommended by non-underwriters outper-
formed the market by 13%.
4. For twelve out of fourteen brokerage firms... examine[d], the av-
erage one-year market-adjusted return after buy recommendations
where they were the lead underwriter was lower than the return after
their recommendations on other banks' IPOs. 34 9
The report concluded that "recommendations by underwriter ana-
lysts show significant evidence of bias., 350 It should be noted that the
Michaely and Womack study focused solely on sell-side recommenda-
tions in relation to IPOs, 35 1 which represents a very small fraction of
companies receiving research coverage.
The Michaely and Womack study, however, only begins the discus-
sion on the impact of investment banking's impact on research. Assum-
ing that Michaely and Womack's findings can be more broadly general-
347. Michaely & Womack, supra note 28, at 660.
348. Id. at 653.
349. Id. at 684 (emphasis omitted).
350. Id. at 653.
351. Michaely & Womack, supra note 28.
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ized for all "investment banking" analysts, how strong is this bias, and
how severely does it impact the investment quality of the research? 352 A
1998 study by Professors Hsiou-wei Lin and Maureen McNichols exam-
ined "the effect of underwriting relationships on [sell-side] analysts'
earnings forecasts and recommendations. 353 The study analyzed 2,400
follow-on equity offerings (i.e., public equity offerings that take place
after the IPO) that took place in 1989-1994, and found that growth fore-
casts and recommendations from sell-side analysts of the firms who
acted as lead or co-underwriter for a company were significantly more
favorable than those made by unaffiliated analysts-although their near-
term earnings forecasts were not generally greater.354 Notably, however,
the study found that "although affiliated analysts' recommendations are
more favorable on average, an investor would not experience weaker
investment performance by following their recommendations than by
following unaffiliated recommendations. 355 A study published in Fall
1995 by Professors Amitabh Dugar and Siva Nathan also found that sell-
side analysts of firms that provide investment banking services to a com-
pany "are optimistic, relative to other (noninvestment [sic] banker) ana-
lysts, in their earnings forecasts and investment recommendations." 356
However, the Dugar & Nathan study also found that returns earned by
following the investment recommendations of investment banker ana-
lysts are not significantly different from those of non-investment banker
analysts.357 Finally, the Dugar & Nathan study found that in spite of the
greater optimism of investment banker earnings forecasts, their "fore-
casts are, on average, as accurate as those of noninvestment [sic] banker
analysts. 3
58
While the academic studies support the notion that "investment
banker" sell-side analysts exhibit an over-optimism compared to non-
investment banker analysts, how strong that bias is appears to be debat-
able. More importantly, however, is the question of whether the invest-
ment banking conflict is the sole answer for analyst underperformance. If
the Regulatory Actions were to truly eliminate the pressures of invest-
ment banking on sell-side research (which they do not), should we expect
a dramatic improvement in the research? Or, are there other factors that
352. Professors Michaely and Womack considered the "credible alternative theory"-that an
investment banking relationship could positively impact sell-side research, rather than bias it, due to
a superior information advantage for underwriter analysts. Id. at 656.
353. Hsiou-wei Lin & Maureen F. McNichols, Underwriting Relationships, Analysts' Earnings
Forecasts and In vestment Recommendations, 25 J. Acr. & ECON. 101, 101 (1998).
354. Id. at 124.
355. Id. at 125.
356. Amitabh Dugar & Siva Nathan, The Effect of Investment Banking Relationships on Finan-
cial Analysts' Earnings Forecasts and Investment Recommendations, 12 J. CAN. ACAD. ACCT.
Ass'N 131, 131 (1995). The study analyzed 102 companies having relationships with eighteen
different brokerage firms from 1983-1988. Id. at 137-38. The non-investment banker analysts came
from an additional thirty-three brokerage firms. Id.
357. Id. at 131.
358. Id. at 154.
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impact the performance of sell-side research that are just as important, if
not more important, than the investment banking conflict? Would sell-
side analysts continue to struggle with the predictive function of their
jobs in an environment without investment banking conflicts? There are
a number factors that both professionals and academics have long under-
stood to impact the accuracy (or inaccuracy) of sell-side analysts' fore-
casts and recommendations other than conflicts of interest, including:
9 Efficient Market Theory and Random Walk Theory - The efficient
market theory espouses that market prices reflect all of the pub-
licly available information at the time. Since analyst recommen-
dations are publicly available,359 such information should imme-
diately be encapsulated into the price of the relevant stock, and
therefore, no abnormal investing advantage should be consistently
garnered by following analysts' investment advice.360 Rather, in-
vestment returns should mirror the returns of the market as a
whole (e.g., if the market increases by ten percent, a broadly-
based portfolio of stock based on analysts' recommendations
would be expected to increase by approximately the same
amount). As a result, a random selection of securities should per-
form just as well as a portfolio chosen upon the advice of research
analysts. On a similar note, the Random Walk Theory provides
that "short-run changes in stock prices cannot be predicted. In-
vestment advisory services, earnings predictions, and complicated
chart patterns are useless.",361 The Random Walk Theory is based
on the notion that markets are moved by news, and news is ran-
dom and unpredictable by definition. 362 Once the news is known,
it is quickly digested by the market and incorporated in the
stock's price.363 As a result, a stock's price moves in a random
and unpredictable manner,364 and analysts should not be expected
to have extraordinary forecasting abilities.
Human Tendency to be Overoptimistic - Some have pondered
whether sell-side analysts' failures may be due, at least in part, to
the basic human tendency to be overoptimistic. For example,
David Dreman, in his book "Contrarian Investment Strategies,"
wrote that:
[T]he literature on overconfidence turns up three major rea-
sons for a wide-ranging optimistic bias. First, people have
359. Boni & Womack, supra note 18, at 99.
360. See supra notes 287-89 and accompanying text (discussing the efficient market theory).
361. MALKIEL, supra note 126, at 24. Taken to its logical extreme, under the Random Walk
Theory, analysts' predictions (whether regarding stock recommendations or earnings forecasts) are
viewed to be useless. Id.
362. Id. at 197.
363. Id.
364. Id.
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unrealistic optimism about future events. Second, they have
unrealistically positive self-evaluations. Third, they have un-
realistic confidence in their ability to control a situation....
People also overestimate the skills and the resources at their
disposal to ensure a favorable outcome, while they underes-
timate the likelihood of problems affecting them person-
ally. 3
65
While an analyst may be aware of the negative repercussions for
overly optimistic projections and of the tendency for a significant
percentage of companies to miss projections, it could be that the
analyst is simply too confident in her ability to pick the good
companies from the bad, and does not adequately discount for
bad things to occur.
9 "Inside" View - Some researchers have argued that decision
makers tend to have an over-optimism bias due to their strong
tendency to adopt an "inside view" when reviewing problems.36
Under the "inside view," the decision maker views problems as
unique, rather than treating them as "an instance of a broader
category," which characterizes the "outside view." 367 Under the
inside view, problems are viewed individually, and are resolved
by considering the specific details of the problem and then con-
structing future scenarios and outcomes based on those details.
368
Under the outside view, the specific details of the individual
problem are largely ignored, and instead the decision is reached
by focusing "on the statistics of a class of cases chosen to be
similar in relevant respects to the present one., 369 Essentially, un-
der the outside view, the problem is treated as one instance in "an
ensemble of similar problems. 370
The result of applying a predominantly inside view is an over-
optimism bias, due to the decision maker ignoring past failures in
similar instances.37' It turns out that research analysts tend to ap-
proach their forecasts and recommendations from an inside
view. 372 For example, if the analyst is trying to develop an earn-
ings forecast for a company, she would typically consider the
company's historical earnings and earnings growth rate, the com-
pany's expected market share, expected growth rate, general eco-
365. DREMAN, CONTRARIAN INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 283, at 15.
366. Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Per-
spective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. ScI. 17 (1993).
367. Id. at 29-30.
368. Id. at 25.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. See id. at 26-27; see also DREMAN, CONTRARIAN INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, supra note
283, at 110.
372. DREMAN, CONTRARIAN INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, supra note 283, at 110.
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nomic outlook, and other similar matters. 373 If the analyst were to
take an outside view (which is not typical), she might consider
"how accurate earnings forecasts have been overall, or how accu-
rate they have been for a specific industry or for the company it-
self, in deciding how precisely the analyst can estimate and the
reliance that can be placed on the forecast., 374 While neither the
inside nor the outside view is perfect, the major problem with the
inside view is that it is based on the idea that the analyst can pre-
dict all of the relevant factors for a particular company, compre-
hend how each of these factors will interrelate, and predict their
outcome. Unfortunately:
[t]he number of possible outcomes when dozens or hundreds
of factors interact in the marketplace is almost infinite. Even
if one could foresee each of the possibilities, the probability
of any particular scenario is negligible. Yet this is precisely
what the analyst is trying to accomplish with a single, pre-
cise prediction.
375
" Overreaction/Underreaction to Information Shocks - Research
has shown that analysts have a tendency to overreact to current
news (i.e., they overweight the significance of recent news and
underweight the significant of prior data).37 6 When applied to ana-
lysts, this tendency results in analysts disproportionately adjusting
their forecasts due to short-run economic developments.
* Inaccurate Data Provided by Companies - If the data that ana-
lysts are employing to analyze companies are inaccurate, it is
highly likely that the analysts' conclusions will be inaccurate as
well. While deliberate falsification of data by companies occurs
on occasion (e.g., Enron and WorldCom) and receives lots of at-
tention, it is the exception and not the rule.3 77 The more trouble-
some source of inaccurate data arises from companies' use of ag-
gressive accounting techniques when reporting their results. Re-
cent examples have involved the overuse by companies of "non-
recurring charges '378 and "pro forma results. 379 Other areas of
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 111.
376. Werner F. M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Do Security Analysts Overreact?, 80 AM.
ECON. REV. 52 (1990).
377. Fernandez, supra note 28, at 6.
378. A non-recurring charge is a one-time charge that is not meant to occur again. Non-
recurring charges are broken out from a company's financial statements, to allow investors to under-
stand how the company would perform in a normal year without such extraordinary charges. Some
companies have taken to over-using these non-recurring charges (i.e., normal charges are labeled
non-recurring), which inflates the expected prospects for the company.
379. Pro forma results are a description of a company's financial statements based on a set of
assumptions. Pro forma results are often used in conjunction with non-recurring charges to show
what the company's performance would have been without the non-recurring charges.
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concern include goodwill accounting, accounting for employee
stock option plans, and the general transparency of financial
statements.38°
" Herding Effect - It has long been presumed that "herding" may
influence the forecasts and recommendations of research analysts.
"Herding," with respect to research analysts, refers to such ana-
lysts possibly underweighting (or ignoring) private information at
their disposal, and instead conforming their forecasts and recom-
mendations with the consensus. The idea is that if an analyst is
going to be wrong, it is much more comfortable if everyone else
was wrong with her.381
* Loss of Best Sell-Side Analysts to Other Positions - Many of the
best sell-side analysts are hired away by institutional investors to
become portfolio managers. Not surprisingly, there is generally
more prestige and better pay to be the person "running the
money," rather than acting as the adviser.382
While there is little doubt that the conflicts faced by research ana-
lysts have had some negative impact on their performance, it is entirely
unclear what the extent of this impact has been and whether the conflicts
substantially impacted the investment value of sell-side research as a
whole. A likely explanation is that analysts' difficulty in forecasting the
future is a combination of many of the above factors, which are not mu-
tually exclusive. Predicting the future will always entail a substantial
amount of error.
V. A SIMPLER SOLUTION TO THE SELL-SIDE RESEARCH ISSUE-
ELIMINATE THE INFORMATION GAP
A. Retail Investors Are in the Dark
The concept that the true value of sell-side analysts may lie in their
information gathering and analysis, rather than their one-word summary
ratings (e.g., buy, hold, or sell) or earnings forecasts, is well understood
by certain investors, but unfortunately, not all. Broadly speaking, inves-
tors can be grouped into two categories: institutional investors and retail
investors. Institutional investors are entities with large amounts of money
to invest, such as mutual funds, insurance companies, pension funds, and
investment banks. Retail investors are basically everyone other than
380. The concept is that some corporate executives will try to boost their company's share
price by manipulating its earnings numbers and earnings growth rates, even though nothing has
changed in the company's underlying business to increase its actual profitability or growth rate.
381. Studies that examine herding include: Ivo Welch, Herding Among Security Analysts, 58 J.
FIN. ECON. 369 (2000); Harrison Hong, et al., Security Analysts' Career Concerns and Herding of
Earnings Forecases, 31 RAND J. ECON. 121 (2000).
382. MALKIEL, supra note 126, at 183.
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institutional investors.383 Of note, retail investors constitute a significant
and ever-growing portion of the stock market, as "[a]lmost half of all
households own stock, up by 60% in the past 15 years. 384
The Regulatory Actions should do little to change the confidence of
institutional investors in sell-side research because, as a general rule,
institutional investors have traditionally discounted the value of invest-
ment advice from sell-side research analysts. 385 The predictive difficul-
ties of sell-side research analysts have not been a secret to institutional
investors, as most claim: (1) to have long understood the biases under
which sell-side analysts operate; 386 and (2) that they are able to "de-bias"
the research. Such an outcome should not be surprising when you look at
how institutional investors operate. Institutional investors (or, at least
good institutional investors) are professional investors who make their
own investment decisions and who often employ their own buy-side ana-
lysts to assist with investment decisions. Rather than use sell-side ana-
lysts for pure investment decisions, institutional investors use sell-side
analysts for information, analysis, and ideas. 387 Sell-side research is only
one of many factors that an institutional investor typically will consider
in making an investment decision. A New York Times editorial de-
scribed the relationship between sell-side analysts and institutional inves-
tors as follows: "Fund managers are not schoolchildren looking for in-
structions on what to buy. They look to [sell-side] analysts for specific
information and general insight.,
388
Where investor confidence levels are likely to be impacted are with
retail investors. However, that confidence may be misplaced, and is
likely to prove to be a substantial harm to those investors. Where institu-
tional investors appear able to de-bias sell-side research, retail investors
have not shown such an ability. 389 To explain this concern, it is useful to
break down the sell-side analyst issue into its fundamental components,
which are roughly as follows:
383. One could also include government entities and corporate (but non-institutional) investors
as additional types of investors, but for simplicity's sake, this Article focuses solely on the institu-
tional investor/retail investor split.
384. United States Senators Max Baucus, Charles Grassley, and John McCain, A Second Be-
trayal, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2003, at A12.
385. Cheryl Winokur Munk, Settlement Does Little to Improve Street's Credibility on Re-
search, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2003; see also Boni & Womack, supra note 18, at 104; Dinallo Affi-
davit, supra note 139, at 10; Leslie Boni & Kent L. Womack, Solving the Sell-Side Research Prob-
lem: Insights from Buy-Side Professionals 10 (Aug. 8, 2002), at http://www.unm.edu/-boni/
RPAWP/RPAWP.htm (last visited Nov. 14,2003).
386. These biases include those caused by investment banking influences and others discussed
supra Part IV.C.
387. See Laurie Meisler, Why Investors Pick Thinkers Over Stock Pickers, (June 19, 2000),
TheStreet.com, Inc., at http://www.thestreet.com/markets/analystrankings/962962.html (last visited
Nov. 14, 2003).
388. Sernovitz, supra note 19.
389. Boni & Womack, supra note 18, at 115.
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" Prior to the recent stock market meltdown, sell-side analysts en-
joyed a privileged status on Wall Street, primarily with average
retail investors, as "informal advisers and stock-picking gurus to
the masses. 39 °
* The stock market suffered a substantial meltdown, beginning in
March 2000, resulting in the loss of trillions of dollars of market
capitalization.
* Sell-side analysts failed to warn investors of the market melt-
down.
" Historically, sell-side analysts have had difficulty at forecasting
and making recommendations. Conflicts of interest have likely
had some impact on this weakness of sell-side analysts, although
the extent of this impact is unclear.
* To truly render sell-side research independent would require a
complete separation of research from investment banking, which
would likely have a very negative impact on sell-side research.
* It is unclear whether rendering sell-side research more independ-
ent would provide a substantial benefit.
* Confidence in sell-side analysts appears to have decreased for re-
tail investors. As an example of retail investors' increased skepti-
cism, a 2002 Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll found that only
thirty-seven percent of Americans "believe that recommendations
from financial advisers are 'primarily motivated' by a desire to
help their clients make money.",39' It does not appear that confi-
dence in sell-side analysts was ever that substantial for institu-
tional investors.
Given this state of events, it appears that the market was properly
taking care of the sell-side analyst issue. Retail investors were getting on
the same page as institutional investors and becoming aware that sell-
side analysts cannot be viewed as oracles when it comes to investing
advice. It was an extremely expensive lesson to learn, but it was being
learned.
While many ideas have been floated as to why sell-side analysts as
a class have underperformed, we simply do not yet know the answer.
And, since we do not yet know the cure for resolving sell-side analysts'
underperformance, it is reckless for the regulators to establish a large and
well-publicized regulatory schema with the stated purpose of restoring
390. Regan, supra note 21.
391. John Harwood, Americans Distrust Institutions in Poll: Low Marks Go to Corporate
Executives, Brokers, Drug and Oil Industries, the Catholic Church, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2002, at
A4.
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confidence in sell-side analysts. The Regulatory Actions perpetuate a
very dangerous information imbalance that was beginning to erode. Insti-
tutional investors will continue to understand the limitations of sell-side
research, while retail investors are encouraged to once again have confi-
dence in a very fallible system. By implementing a major overhaul of the
sell-side research regulatory environment, the regulators have given the
message that sell-side research has been materially improved. As a result,
when the bulls retake control of Wall Street, retail investors will be
primed to once again unquestioningly believe in the words of the sage
sell-side analysts, only to be disappointed when the next bear market
strikes.
The global settlement did include $80 million for investor education
programs. 392 Presumably, one purpose of these programs will be to edu-
cate retail investors that sell-side analysts should not be relied upon
blindly. While such programs serve as nice talking points for politicians,
this author is extremely skeptical that anything effective will come from
the investor education programs. To demonstrate this point, one need
only look at the results from an investor survey that was recently con-
ducted by the NASD.393 In the survey, the NASD "asked 1,086 [retail]
investors more than 50 basic . ..questions about investing in stocks,
bonds and mutual funds. 3 94 Some of the more shocking findings of the
survey include:
" Nearly 50 percent [of respondents] thought stock market losses
were insured.
" Seventy percent of investors failed to understand that when you
buy on margin, you can lose all of your investment even if the
value of your shares does not go to zero.
" Nearly 80 percent did not understand fully the meaning of "no
load" mutual funds.
395
Based on the NASD survey, retail investors appear to be so poorly
informed about basic investment information that it is simply not realistic
to believe that they can be educated sufficiently to debias the weaknesses
and conflicts that plague sell-side research.
392. See supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text.
393. NASD Investor Literacy Research (Executive Summary), Prepared by Applied Research
& Consulting LLC (2003), available at http://www.nasdr.com/pdf-text/surveyeyecsum.pdf (last
visited Jan. 31, 2004); see also NASD News Release, NASD Announces $10-Million Education
Fund-Investor Survey Underscores Importance of Education, Dec. 2, 2003, available at http://
www.nasdr.com/news/pr2003/release_03_054.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2004) [hereinafter NASD
News Release].
394. NASD News Release, supra note 393.
395. Id.
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B. Mandatory Warning Label
Until now, this Article has focused on criticizing the approach taken
by the Regulatory Actions to address the sell-side analyst problem. Now
it is time to offer a dramatically simpler solution to the problem. The
most effective solution is the most traditional one: disclosure. As Louis
Brandeis so eloquently put it, "Publicity is justly commended as a rem-
edy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."3 96 Sell-side
research should be required to carry a warning label ("Mandatory Warn-
ing Label") that clearly points out the possible failings of sell-side re-
search, and puts retail investors, as much as possible, on the same infor-
mational footing as institutional investors. The Mandatory Warning La-
bel should read roughly as follows:
SEC WARNING: The Securities and Exchange Commission warns
investors that: (1) it is unclear whether investing strategies based on
research analysts' recommendations will consistently outperform the
market; (2) research analysts have consistently proven to be overly
optimistic about the future performance of the companies they cover;
and (3) research analysts operate under a multitude of conflicts and
biases that negatively impact the quality of their research. Before
making an investment decision, you should conduct your own re-
search, rather than rely solely on the advice of a research analyst. If
you are not capable of conducting your own research, you should
consider less risky investments than individual stocks.
Since sell-side analysts' forecasting and recommendation functions
have shown consistent and material weaknesses, 397 and since it is unclear
whether there is a ready fix to these weaknesses, 398 the solution to the
sell-side research issue should focus on warning research recipients of
these weaknesses. For investors that are able to conduct their own re-
search and de-bias the sell-side research of its weaknesses, they have
been clearly warned and can take appropriate precautions when consider-
ing sell-side research. They can profit from the value of the research,
while at the same time protect themselves from the weaknesses. For
those investors who are not capable of conducting such independent re-
search, they have been formally warned that it may be advisable to find a
less risky investment than individual stocks. Rather than leave vulnerable
investors to deal with myths and misunderstandings about the value of
sell-side research, the Mandatory Warning Label would clearly and suc-
cinctly put them on notice.
396. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (Fre-
derick A. Stokes Comp., 10th prtg. 1934).
397. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
398. See discussion supra Parts IV.B and C.
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The Mandatory Warning Label would also serve to better align the
desired behavior of both the recipients and producers of sell-side re-
search. For the recipients of sell-side research, the desire should be that
they not behave recklessly in their investment decisions. As noted above,
the Mandatory Warning Label clearly and succinctly puts them on notice
of the weaknesses of sell-side research. For the producers of sell-side
research, the desire should be that they produce an abundance of accurate
research. Therefore, any approach to the sell-side research issue should
avoid overly burdening the producers of research (which would lead to
substantially reduced resources being committed to sell-side research),
while at the same time encouraging the producers to find ways to im-
prove the accuracy of their product. Rather than have regulators theorize
about what is necessary to improve research, the Mandatory Warning
Label would squarely place the burden of improving the quality of re-
search on the producers. Forcing producers of research to carry the Man-
datory Warning Label should provide ample incentive (at least for those
who market their research to retail investors) to develop concrete mecha-
nisms and evidence that demonstrates the value of their research, so as to
overcome the Mandatory Warning Label.
To give the Mandatory Warning Label maximum effect, it should
be given by the SEC. Just as the Surgeon General is able to lend credibil-
ity to the warnings on cigarette packages, the SEC, as the most promi-
nent administrative agency that oversees the capital markets, should be
able to provide a similar function for the Mandatory Warning Label.
Moreover, the SEC should be charged with continuing to follow the re-
search analyst issue and adjusting the Mandatory Warning Label as new
developments arise.
Because the Mandatory Warning Label is aimed at retail investors,
it is crucial that it be clear and concise. While there is an abundance of
disclosure regarding research analysts and their historical performance in
the Regulatory Actions, it is likely that much of this disclosure will be
lost on retail investors. As is so often the case with new disclosure re-
quirements, the focus of the requirements is on producing a large volume
of raw data, rather than providing easily digestible information. 399 For
example, the New NASD/NYSE Regulations require firms in each re-
search report (and research analysts during each public appearance) to
make a number of different disclosures which are meant to indicate pos-
sible conflicts of interest that the research analyst or her firm might have
399. See Joseph Bartlett, Sarbanes-Oxlev: Too Much Disclosure?, VC EXPERTS (Dec. 10,
2002), at http://vcexperts.com (examining the issue of too much disclosure) (subscription required)
(article on file with author). In the article, Joseph Bartlett ponders whether new disclosure require-
ments are motivating companies to produce so much disclosure that it becomes virtually "unreadable
to anybody other than a financial professional." Id. To illustrate his point, Mr. Bartlett discussed a
recent public disclosure filing by AT&T in connection with the merger of AT&T Broadband with
Comcast which was 800 pages long. Id.
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vis-a-vis the subject company, including: (1) equity ownership in the
subject company by either the firm or the research analysts; 400 (2) client
relationships, and compensation arrangements, with the subject com-
pany; 40 and (3) officer, director, or advisory board positions held by the
research analyst in the subject company. °2 While such information may
be valuable to an institutional investor who is experienced at de-biasing
sell-side research (and knows where to look for it in the research report),
it is not so clear how helpful it is to retail investors. First, while such
disclosure indicates possible conflicts of interest that the analyst may
have, it provides no explanation of the correlation between those con-
flicts and their historical impact on sell-side research. For disclosure to
be meaningful, it must be plain and clear, rather than simply technically
accurate. Is every retail investor supposed to know that sell-side analysts
of firms, which have an investment banking relationship with the cov-
ered company, have demonstrated a historical tendency to be over-
optimistic in their forecasts and recommendations? Some informed aca-
demics have considered as a credible theory that "investment banking"
sell-side analysts might be "not only unbiased but also more accurate,"
due to a superior information advantage.40 3
Even some of the more interesting new disclosure requirements will
likely be hard to understand for most retail investors. For example, the
New NASD/NYSE Regulations require that firms disclose in all research
reports (although this disclosure is not required by research analysts dur-
ing public appearances): (1) the percentage of securities assigned to
buy/hold/sell categories and the percentage of companies within each of
these three categories for whom the firm has provided investment bank-
ing services within the past twelve months ;44 and (2) a price chart that
graphically illustrates the historical price trends of the covered stock,
with indications of the dates on which the firm assigned or changed each
rating or price target, and what the rating was in each case.40 5 Once
again, this can be very valuable raw data that can be very beneficial to
sophisticated investors who are skilled at de-biasing research. However,
it too falls short of the needs of less sophisticated retail investors, who
need more than raw data. For many investors, their need is digested con-
clusions, which is the whole reason that they became so reliant on the
advice of the research analysts in the first place. The Mandatory Warning
400. NASD Rules 2711 (h)(I)(A)-(B); NYSE Rules 472(k)(l)(i)(c), (k)(l)(iii)(b), (k)(2)(i)(a)-
(b).
401. NASD Rules 2711 (h)(2)(A)-(B); NYSE Rules 472(k)(l)(i)-(iii), (k)(2)(i)(b), (c), (f).
402. NASD Rule 271 l(h)(3); NYSE Rules 472(k)(1)(iii)(c), (k)(2)(i)(e).
403. Michaely & Womack, supra note 28, at 656; see also Joseph McLaughlin, The Changing
Role of the Securities Analyst in Initial Public Offerings, INSIGHTS, Aug. 1994, at 6 (discussing the
benefits of having sell-side analysts involved in the IPO process).
404. NASD Rule 271 l(h)(5); NYSE Rule 472(k)(l )(i)(g).
405. NASD Rule 271 1(h)(6); NYSE Rule 472(k)(l)(i)(h); see also supra note 250 and accom-
panying text.
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Label is meant to provide these most vulnerable investors some very
valuable digested conclusions-namely, that analysts can be wrong.
Finally, the new disclosure falls prey to a constant nemesis of mean-
ingful disclosure-it looks like boilerplate. With respect to the new dis-
closure in written reports, it more closely resembles the fine print on the
back of a contract of adhesion40 6 than it does meaningful information.
Since the New NASD/NYSE Regulations permit the new disclosure to
be included anywhere in the research report (including on the last page),
so long as the front page indicates where the disclosures can be found, it
is not surprising that most firms have taken to burying the disclosure on
the last page, where it is unlikely to be read by any but the most sophisti-
cated investors. The disclosures made in public appearances by research
analysts fare no better in the battle against boilerplate. Much of the re-
quired disclosure (such as buy, hold, and sell ratios, and historical per-
formance of the research analyst) is not required to be made in public
appearances; 407 presumably because it is too long and cumbersome for
such a forum. Even for the disclosure that is made in public appearances,
all one has to do is watch a few analyst interviews on CNBC to see the
bored expression of both the analyst and the interviewer as the analyst
recites her prepared disclosure statement.
The Mandatory Warning Label, which is as easily delivered in print
as it is orally, is meant to break through the impact of such bored recitals,
and instill skepticism in the class of investors that most needs to take a
skeptical approach when investing in individual stocks. Retail investors
should be aware of the substantial amount of risk that is involved when
investing in individual stocks-that analysts do not have mystical for-
tune-telling powers, and that less risky alternatives are available. With
respect to written reports, the Mandatory Warning Label should be in-
cluded at the top of the front page (no exceptions), in large, clear font-
type, of any research report that includes a projection, recommendation,
or price target. The Mandatory Warning Label should also be required
for: (1) any public appearance by a research report where a projection,
recommendation, or price target is delivered; and (2) any conversation
(including via telephone) where a broker refers to a research report when
recommending a particular investment strategy to a client. Since many
investors receive their investment advice from talking with their broker,
rather than from reading a research report, it is critical that broker con-
versations be subject to the Mandatory Warning Label requirement.
406. A contract of adhesion is a standard form printed contract that is typically not negotiable.
I ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.4 (3d ed. 1993). They are "take-it or leave-
it" contracts, such as insurance policies, the contract you sign to open a bank account, the contract
you sign to purchase a television, etc. See id.
407. See NASD Rules 2711 (h)(5)-(6); NYSE Rules 472(k)(l)(i)(g)-(h), (k)(2).
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The Mandatory Warning Label would operate nicely with much of
the Regulatory Actions, including the increased disclosure requirements,
the personal trading restrictions, and Regulation AC. As noted earlier,
while the new analyst trading restrictions and Regulation AC are not
likely to materially improve the quality of sell-side research, neither are
these changes likely to result in major negative repercussions, so long as
they do not materially restore investor confidence in sell-side research
(which should be taken care of by the Mandatory Warning Label). With
regards to the Regulatory Actions that involve separating research from
investment banking, they should be largely eliminated. We need to be
honest about what can be enforced and what cannot be enforced. Setting
up rules that can be easily circumvented is likely to further the informa-
tion imbalance that the Mandatory Warning Label would be addressing
(since more knowledgeable investors are more likely to become aware
that the rules are being circumvented). Additionally, easily circumvented
rules degrade respect for securities regulations amongst Wall Street pro-
fessionals as lack of true compliance with the rules becomes more preva-
lent.
CONCLUSION
Not every problem is fixable. Sometimes the best solution is simply
to provide an effective warning. The key to understanding what to do
about sell-side research is to recognize it for what it is. Sell-side research
is a product, and like many products, it has both strengths and weak-
nesses. Take aspirin for example. Aspirin is an incredibly valuable drug
with numerous applications to assist in furthering the health and well-
being of people. Aspirin also has a number of very serious side effects,
including the ability to kill people who take too much aspirin. How do
we deal with the side effects for aspirin? Do we require aspirin manufac-
turers to fundamentally change how aspirin is manufactured, but in the
process risk destroying the value of aspirin? Or even worse, do we give
false comfort that the dangers of aspirin have been removed? Of course
not. Instead, we require aspirin manufacturers to disclose the risks of
using aspirin, allowing consumers to make an informed choice on
whether or not to take it. There is no reason to treat sell-side research any
differently. By providing a clear warning of sell-side research's weak-
nesses, maybe retail investors could then view sell-side analysts more
realistically-they are valuable sources of information, not clairvoyants
with the ability to see the future.

